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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. What is the Regional Reserve Project? 
The Regional Reserve Project (now RR Project) is a project developed by the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) with the aim of improving the management of 
food crises in the region. The RR project encompasses three components: building a Regional Food 
Security Reserve (now RR), increasing the level of national PS and improving of the cooperation 
between national PS. The RR will be made of grains (millets-sorghum, maize, rice, enriched 
cereals) and “gari” (milled cassava) and used to back national tools of ECOWAS Member States 
when they are facing a food crisis. The RR project is not implemented yet but the framework is 
ready and the institutions are in place. The first purchases of grain are currently on-going.  
Fig. 1. ECOWAS countries 
 
Source: Wikipedia 
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1.2. The RR Project in historical perspective  
The idea to create a regional food reserve is born following the 2008 crisis. However, its deep 
roots probably have to be found some years before in the past, more precisely in 2005 when all 
Sahel countries faced a major crisis due to the bad harvest of millet and sorghum (drought + locust 
attack). At that time, PS had a very bad fame: since the liberalization of grain marketing at the end 
of the 1980s’, rules have been established to restrict their size and control their use: the Stocks 
Nationaux de Sécurité (SNS) were co-managed with the donors (double signature): only targeted 
transfers were allowed (not interventions to stabilize prices), only in emergency situation 
(qualified as such by Early Warning Systems) and only to food insecure households.  
However, something unexpected occurred after the 2005 crisis: a revival of PS. The three Sahel 
countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) decided to build a second PS directly managed by the 
government. Mali also created more than 700 decentralized PS managed by the 700 municipality 
of the country. Some elements of the RR Project rationale emerged at that time: the wish for more 
PS, the wish for more independence vis-à-vis the international community and the subsidiarity 
principle.  
Then, came the 2008 crisis. This time, the crisis came from international markets in the form of a 
sharp increase in the price of imported rice. Moreover, shortages occurred on international 
markets resulting in importers of the different West African countries facing difficulties to find 
rice to buy. This resulted in a strong lack of confidence in international markets. And here is 
probably the main source of the idea that some kinds of reserves are necessary to manage import 
delays or delays in mobilizing international aid.   
Another consequence of the 2008 crisis is that many West African countries implemented export 
bans with the aim of mitigating price increases on their domestic market. These measures were 
not really effective (they were circumnavigated most of the time, see Staatz et al.), but 
demonstrated the lack of solidarity between countries of West Africa. And here is probably the 
source of the idea that a solution may be found in mutualizing part of the public stocks. As we will 
see later on, this idea was concretized through two different initiatives: the networking of national 
PS (RESOGEST) and the building of a regional reserve1.    
 
1.3. The RR Project’s policy background and the doctrine of the ‘three lines of 
defense’ 
The RR project is an additional component to the current of policies aiming to manage food crises: 
regional and national trade policies and national and local storage policies. The RR project 
encompasses not only creating a new reserve (at the regional level) but also increasing the level 
of national public stocks. 
Regional and national trade policies 
Since January 2015, ECOWAS is a custom union. Before this date, a custom union already existed 
in West Africa (WAEMU) but it was involving only the French-speaking countries of the region. 
                                                             
1 However, there is a paradox here because in 2008, as all countries have been hurt at the same time by the 
international markets crisis, mutualized means would not have helped so much.   
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Since 2015 the common external tariff (CET) also applied to Nigeria, Ghana and the other English-
speaking countries.  
What is of crucial importance from a food security perspective is the level of the tariff applied to 
rice imports. The fixation of ECOWAS rice CET gave raise to lively debates between the countries 
that used to tax heavily rice imports in order to boost local production (especially Nigeria) and 
countries that used to apply a low tariff in order to protect consumers (WAEMU CET was fixed at 
10%). Finally ECOWAS CET for rice was also fixed at 10%. These taxes are perceived by national 
government. In addition, taxes are perceived by ECOWAS (they account for 2.5% of the value of 
rice imports). 
However, in practice, taxes on rice imports import are much higher: each country applies a VAT 
on rice and, as these taxes are in fact only paid by the imported rice, they play exactly the same 
role as a tariff on rice imports. The difference being that the level of this tariff is fixed by national 
governments whereas the CET is fixed at the ECOWAS level. In practice, for rice, the VAT rate is 
usually between 15% and 35% depending on the country. 
 
National and local storage policies 
Local stocks or “cereal banks” are collective stocks managed at the local level (villages or group of 
villages) by communities. Therefore, strictly speaking, these stocks are not public stocks except in 
Mali where they are managed by municipalities (each of the 700 municipalities of the country has 
its own “cereal bank”). These local stocks seek to improve food security in the community. They 
exist mainly in the three Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger). A rough estimation is that in 
each of these three countries around 1000 cereal banks are operating, each of them managing 
around 15 tons of grains. In the other countries of the region, cereal banks also exist but their 
number is rather small.  
The narrative of cereal banks is that they contribute to stabilizing prices and reducing traders’ 
excessive margins and speculation. However, in practice, they manage rather small quantities and 
their selling prices is usually close to the market price (otherwise they would not cover their costs, 
their working capital would vanish and they would be likely to collapse). Therefore if they are not 
able to stabilize price or to provide sales at subsidized prices, what is the role of cereal banks? It 
seems that they provide two kinds of value added. The first one is “psychological”: whatever 
experts think about the ability of so small cereal banks to provide a response to food crises, the 
fact is that when a cereal bank is around people feel more secure. This feeling of security does not 
only provide some kind of psychological well-being: it is also likely to influence behaviors: when 
people feel more secure, they are less likely to panic when prices raises. The second value added 
by cereal banks is allowing poor households purchasing small quantities. Usually, in rural areas, 
grain transactions are made by bags (contrary to towns where retailers offer small quantities). 
Therefore, as most cereal banks (not all) accept to sell small quantities, they give an improved 
access to food to households who would have face difficulties to find the money to buy a bag2.  
                                                             
2 I am grateful to Roger Blein (Bureau Issala) for drawing my attention on this second value added of cereal 
banks. 
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National PS. In the region, only Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) and Nigeria have 
significant PS. Some coastal countries do not have any PS (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée Bissau, Senegal) 
while others have a very small one (10,000 to 15,000 t in Benin and Togo). PS in Sahel countries 
are clearly higher although their level is quite low if compared with consumption needs. For 
instance the PS level of Mali in March 2011 accounted for less than 1% of national consumption 
(around 3 days of consumption). Since 2005, each Sahel country has two physical stocks: the Stock 
National de Sécurité (SNS) created at the end of the 1980s which is co-managed with the donors 
and an ‘intervention stock’ created after the 2005 crisis and managed by the country government 
alone. The SNS can be used only following an alert of the early warning system (EWS) and the 
agreement of both the government and the donors group (double signature). It is used exclusively 
for providing food transfers (not for price stabilization). Note that the size of the SNS is 
structurally below its target level (35,000 tons for Burkina Faso and Mali; 100,000 tons for Niger). 
The intervention PS can be used by the government exactly as he wants (for stabilizing prices or 
providing transfers), although due to the low quantity stored, any attempt to act on prices is 
unlikely to be effective. Last but not least, Nigeria has probably the biggest stock of the region but 
its level is unknown (as such Nigeria is for West Africa what China is for the World market)3.  
Table 1. Public storage capacities and national PS in ECOWAS countries 
COUNTRIES Public storage 
capacities 
Level of PS 
(March 2011) 
Total SNS* SIE 
BENIN  18 080 n.a.     
BURKINA FASO  98 100 38 000 28 000 [35 000] 10 000 
CABO VERDE  46 390       
CÔTE D’IVOIRE  69 796 0     
GAMBIA  372 500       
GHANA  80 218       
GUINEE  116 000       
GUINEE BISSAU  12 280 0     
LIBERIA  17 400       
MALI  136 150 37 000 17 000 [35 000] 20 000 
NIGER  154 700 62 000 32 000 [100 000] 30 000 
NIGERIA  1 346 000 n.a.     
SENEGAL  87 340 0     
SIERRA LEONE  28 300       
TOGO  92 500 n.a.     
TOTAL 2,675,754 137,000 77,000 60,000 
     
Sources: CSAO (2012) for public storage facilities, UEMOA (2011) for the levels of PS in UEMOA 
countries. 
*The figure into brackets indicates the target level of SNS  
 
                                                             
3 As we will see, in the feasibility study of the reserve, the assumption has been made that the size of this 
stock is around 150,000 tons, although some experts thinks that it may be much higher (between 300,000 
and 400,000 tons). But the truth is that nobody knows. That’s why the Nigeria case study is so important. 
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Note also that, although the level of national stocks is low, public storage capacities are quite 
important (part of them is rented to traders). This may render less difficult any strategy of 
increasing national PS (as we will see, this strategy is part of the RR project) and offer 
opportunities for the future RR. 
Following the 2005 crisis, a network of the national PS agencies of the region has been created by 
the CILSS: the RESOGEST. Its objectives are: i) developing technical support between the PS 
agencies (the ones of the three Sahel countries have much more experience and capacities in this 
area) ii) and promoting loans of grain between PS agencies in order to mutualize the risk (the 
decision has been made later on that 5% of the reserve of each SNS should be available for PS of 
other countries of the region but the conditions to get these 5% still need to be clarified)4. 
 
The doctrine of the three lines of defense 
The RR project is backed by a doctrine based on the principle of subsidiarity. This doctrine is 
usually referred to as the “three lines of defense”. The principles of subsidiarity means that in case 
of crisis, local stocks should be used first and then relied by national stocks themselves backed by 
regional stocks.  
The RR project not only seeks to add a third level of stock (at the regional level) but also to increase 
significantly the level of national PS and to improve the interaction between national PS (by 
strengthening the RESOGEST) and the articulation between the different level of stocks (local, 
national and regional)5.    
 Note that the doctrine of the three lines of defense is only on storage policies: it does not really 
encompass the articulation with trade policies (we will come back to this later on).  
 
1.4. Scope and methodology of the study 
As the RR project is a new-born (the first grain purchases to build the RR are still on-going), it is 
difficult to draw lessons from its experience. However, two reasons justify reflexing on the RR 
Project. First, it is a very innovative tool both in its modalities (the RR is a regional tool at the 
service of national policies) and in its objective (apart from its food security objective, the RR 
Project has several political objectives such as increasing the region food sovereignty and the 
solidarity between ECOWAS Member States). Second, to some extent, the RR project may be a 
                                                             
4 The problem is that the PS agencies are not the ones who decide on the use of the stock they manage (this 
decision is made by National Committees for food security). 
5 For instance, procurement of national PS can generate interesting opportunities of sales for cereal banks 
(of surplus regions). However, sales or free distribution implemented by national PS may be very damaging 
for cereal banks (of deficit areas) by generating a decrease in local prices that can prevent cereal banks to 
sell at remunerative prices. A solution to this problem would be to develop contracts between national PS 
and cereal banks (what would require stimulating the development of networks of cereal banks, otherwise, 
the transaction costs would be too high). For instance, when implementing sales at fair prices (usually 
around 40% below market prices), national PS could rely on cereal banks either by purchasing them grains 
(at the current market price) or by selling them grains at subsidized prices, allowing them by this way to 
sell below market prices. The Burkina Faso report (of this study) provides more details on the ways to 
articulate local stocks and national PS. 
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source of inspiration for other regions of the World (the ECOWAS RR Project has been presented 
as a pilot during the G20 2011 negotiations on managing agricultural price instability).   
The RR Project is not operational for now but the infrastructures, the rules and the institutions 
are already in place, meaning that it’s possible reflexing about the RR Project framework. More 
precisely, two approaches are possible: 
 Evaluating the building process of the RR (setting-up of infrastructures, institutional 
design, rules and procedures, constitution of the physical and financial reserves etc.) and 
more generally the implementation process of the RR Project. Many difficulties arose in 
this process and the development of the RR has been delayed by 3 years. A specific study 
has been commissioned to analyze the sources of these difficulties and propose solution 
to overcome them.  
 Discussing the relevance of the RR Project for improving the management of food crises 
in West-Africa. Developing this second approach is precisely the aim of the present report.  
We will begin (section 2) by discussing the coherence of the RR Project (the adequacy of its 
infrastructures, rules and funding strategy with its objectives) before discussing its adequacy with 
the main characteristics of the dynamics of food crises in West Africa (section 3). More specifically, 
we will identify the main types of food crises faced by the region during the last years and try to 
imagine what may have been the effect of the RR Project in improving the management of these 
crises. By “improving” we will refer to three criteria related to the objectives of the RR Project: 
reducing food insecurity, improving the food sovereignty of the countries and the region and 
increasing the solidarity between the countries of the region. We will then conclude on the 
potential benefits and challenges of the RR Project.  
 
 
2. DISCUSSING THE INTERNAL COHERENCE OF THE RR PROJECT  
In this chapter we will present the RR project and discuss its internal coherence (adequacy of its 
infrastructures, rules and financing to its objectives). The objectives themselves will not be 
discussed (they express the sovereignty of West-African States) but their relevance regarding the 
past experience of managing food crises in West Africa will be discussed in the next chapter. But 
let’s begin by presenting the policy background of the RR project.   
2.1. Objectives of the RR Project 
The general objective of the RR project is “to effectively respond to food crises alongside State 
governments and stakeholders whilst contributing to the implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP 
with a regional food security and sovereignty perspective” (ECOWAS 2012, p. 34). Its specific 
objectives are expressed as follows (ECOWAS 2012): 
“SO1. : The Regional Food Security Reserve complements the work carried out by the Member 
States and provides quick and diversified food and nutritional aid, based on the specific needs of 
the various communities hit by cyclical shocks, through regional safety tools that combine food 
and financial resources; 
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SO2. : The Regional Food Security Reserve expresses regional solidarity with regard to Member 
States and populations affected by cyclical food crises, though transparent, equitable and 
predictable mechanisms. It enhances local, national and regional capacities in crisis management 
and allows international solidarity to streamline its support by working together with local, 
national and regional stakeholders as part of an approach based on subsidiarity.  
SO3. : The Regional Food Security Reserve contributes to food sovereignty and to the region’s 
political, economic and commercial integration, by developing synergies with programs that 
target growth in agricultural production, market facilitation and regulation, promotion of social 
safety net, and risk prevention and management.” 
 
The words used clearly show that, as far as food security is concerned, the RR project is 
characterized by i) its focus on managing food crises, not treating chronic malnutrition (“cyclical 
shocks”, “cyclical food crises”) ii) its choice of providing transfers, not stabilizing prices, as a mean 
to manage food crises (“regional safety tools that combine food and financial resources”). These 
two choices (excluding price stabilization; excluding treatment of chronic malnutrition) were 
difficult (lively debates occurred until an agreement was found)6. In the usual typology of food 
security PS, the RR would therefore be classified as an ‘emergency reserve’ (see table 2 below). 
 
Table 2. The ECOWAS RR is an emergency reserve 
Objective 
Timeframe 
Stabilize prices Provide transfers to poor 
households 
Interventions in periods of 
crisis only 
Stabilization PS Emergency reserves 
 
ECOWAS RR 
 
Permanent interventions 
 
 
 
Safety net PS 
 
 
Source: The typology of PS is adapted from OECD (2014) 
 
A careful reading of the specific objectives quoted above shows that the RR project aims to 
improve the management of food crisis both vis-à-vis international aid and vis-à-vis national 
policies (in both cases to complement them not substitute them). Moreover, the targeted 
improvement is not only related to food security objectives, buy also to political objectives: 
strengthening the region food sovereignty and the solidarity among Member States, while 
respecting a subsidiarity principle based of four scales (local, national, regional, international). 
The objectives of the RR Project are summarized in table 3 below. 
 
                                                             
6 Note that the objective of creating a second regional reserve whose aim would be stabilizing grain prices 
is mentioned in ECOWAS storage policy documents but for now nothing has been done in that direction. 
Note also that the objective of addressing chronic malnutrition is not really addressed by national 
institutions (except maybe in Ghana) but in some cases by external organizations (in Mali a World bank-
funded project, in Niger international organizations and NGOs). 
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Table 3. Objectives of the RR Project  
 Political objectives Food security objectives 
Vis-à-vis 
international aid 
 
 
 
Food sovereignty of ECOWAS 
member States  
 
Improving FS by complementing  
international aid  
 
 
Vis-à-vis national 
policies 
Solidarity between ECOWAS 
member States 
 
Improving FS by fostering and 
complementing  national policies   
 
 
2.2. Infrastructures 
Storage facilities  
 
The idea is to use existing storage facilities (hold by national PS agencies). The location of 
warehouses was off course a very sensitive subject. The principles have been “covering all 
ECOWAS Members” but at the same time “prioritizing fast access to aid for vulnerable Sahel 
populations, due to the increasing frequency of major crises in this part of the region”. The location 
of the physical stocks was also based on their proximity to major production areas and “the 
availability of storage facilities as well as the existence of competent institutions with proven 
experience in managing a food security reserve” (ECOWAS 2012, p. 49). These institutions are the 
national PS agencies: NFRA (Nigeria), OPVN (Niger), SONAGESS (Burkina Faso), OPAM (Mali), 
NAFCO (Ghana) and CSA (Senegal). Four storage sites were selected: “Northern Nigeria / Niger 
(Eastern subregion); south Mali, Burkina Faso, northern Ghana (Central subregion) Senegal 
(Atlantic West subregion); Guinea / Liberia / Sierra Leone (Gulf Atlantic subregion), see figure 2 
below. Two sites have access to the ports of Tema and Dakar.  
Fig. 2. Location of RR storage sites 
 
Source: ECOWAS (2012) 
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The quantities to be stored on the different sites are correlated with expected needs. The Eastern 
and Central subregions represent 96% of the physical Regional Reserve, “taking into 
consideration the magnitude of the needs of landlocked Sahelian countries.” (ECOWAS, 2012). 
 
Stocks  
The composition of the physical component of the reserve is based on “the major food systems in 
the region, which correspond to the major production areas, together with the suitability of the 
produce for storage”. Finally, the ECOWAS Commission recommended “starting with a fairly 
limited range of foodstuffs: cereals (millet, sorghum, maize, rice) and tubers (gari). The 
proportions of each cereal and the place of gari will vary according to storage site. The 
introduction of nutritional products (enriched flour) is recommended from the first stage” 
(ECOWAS 2012). 
The size of the RR (and the required increase in the size of national PS) has been calibrated by 
using the method presented on figure 3 below.  
 
Fig. 3. Determining the size of the RR 
 
Source: ECOWAS (2012) 
 
The analysis was based on ‘estimates of annual needs during crisis’ provided by a retrospective 
analysis of the food needs of the populations affected by a crisis since 2000 (the analysis has been 
made in 2012). Only the shock that created the most needs in each country over the past twelve 
years has been used and the figures were corrected to take into account the demographic growth 
(UN projected population data for 2020, were used). This approach is consistent with the focus of 
the RR on managing crises (not dealing with chronic malnutrition).  
The second step was determining the share of the needs that should be “met regionally”. This 
share has been determined by the necessity to manage “the delays in mobilizing international aid 
(financial resources and aid in kind)”, These delays have been estimated to be from 1.5 to 2 
months for coastal countries and from 3 to 4 months for landlocked countries (ECOWAS, 2012). 
Estimate of Annual Needs During Crisis 
Period by 2020 
Needs Met Regionally Needs Not Met Regionally 
Needs Met by Regional Reserve by 
2020 
Needs Met by National/Local Stocks 
by 2020 
Needs Met by Physical Stock Needs Met by Financial Stock by 2020 
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It has therefore been decided that the region should be able to cover needs corresponding to 1.5 
months for coastal countries and 3 months for landlocked countries7.  
The third step has been allocating the needs that should be met regionally between the RR and 
national PS? In the name of a principle of subsidiarity, , it was been decided that “the Regional 
Reserve will meet 33% of the needs that should be met regionally, “the remaining 67% being 
directly backed up by national stocks.”  
This procedure allowed estimating the required size of the RR (411,554 tons) and national PS 
(841,083 tons). Given the current size of national PS (estimated to 227,000 tons8), the required 
increase in national PS has been estimated to 614,083 tons (see table A.1 in annex for more 
details).   
The last step has been defining the weight of the physical and financial components of the RR. “In 
order to reduce the inherent constraints and costs of the physical storage of food” and because 
“experience in this area show that nowadays financial stock can be converted into foodstuffs 
almost immediately” the choice as been made that “one third of the Regional Reserve remains in 
the form of a physical stock, with the other two thirds consisting of financial stock”, with “some 
flexibility in the one-third/two-third distribution”. This method gave a RR for the equivalent of 
411,000 tons by 2020, portioned as follows: physical stock = 140,000 tons and financial stock = 
equivalent to 271,000 tons. 
It has been planned to build progressively the RR and to increase national stocks in a period of 8 
years beginning in 2013 (see table 4 below).  However, all the process has been delayed: the 
increase in national PS did not occur, the financial reserve does not exist and the first purchases 
for the physical reserve are just beginning now (mid-2016).  
Table 4: Eight-year plan for building the Regional Reserve and increasing national PS (Tons) 
 
Source: ECOWAS (2012)  
 
 
The composition of the physical component of the reserve will initially be the following 
(RAAF/PASANAO, 2005): millet 25%, sorghum 24%, maize 26%, gari (milled cassava) 14%, rice 
7% and enriched flour 5%. The composition of the RR by storage location is given in table A.2 in 
annex.  
                                                             
7 Taking the upper bound of the ranges (2 months and 4 months) would have led to a reserve close to 
600,000 tons (instead of 400,000) cf. ECOWAS 2012, graph 2 p. 42. 
8 According to ECOWAS (2012): data extracted from UEMOA (2011): 77,000 tons, to which Nigeria’s stock 
is added: 150,000 tons. 
 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 
Regional 
Reserve 
0 176,380 176,380 176,380 176,380 293,967 293,967 293,967 411,554 
Physical 
Reserve 
0 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 140,000 
Financial 
Reserve 
0 116,380 116,380 116,380 116,380 193,967 193,967 193,967 271,554 
National 
Stocks  
227,000 360,464 360,464 360,464 360,464 600,774 600,774 600,774 841,083 
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2.3. Rules and decision-making procedures 
  
Rules for procuring grains 
The general principle is prioritizing stock supplies using local products. The reasons given are 
related to several specific objectives of ECOWAP mentioning food sovereignty and the wish to 
reduce dependence on imports (ECOWAS 2012, p. 55). However, cost may be an additional 
argument as the price of rice (the main imported grain) is about 50% higher than the price of 
locally-produced millet, sorghum and maize. Moreover, “considering the size of the reserve 
(60,000 tons initially, 140,000 by 2020), its supply is largely within the scope of the regional 
production capacity and market”. As procuring grains on the local market may generate upward 
pressures on prices, “the reserve will purchase from the main production areas with surpluses 
during the post-harvest period”.  
Two procedures will be used: direct purchases to producers’ organizations (POs) for specific 
volumes and public bids open to POs traders and processors. The idea is “establishing a regularly 
updated list of agreed suppliers”. POs, traders and processors will be accredited by the bodies in 
charge of making product purchases and managing the stocks on behalf of the Regional Reserve 
according to “specific criteria of capacity and professionalism”. Public bids will indicate “needs by 
specifying product types, characteristics, qualities, specification of lots, purchase methods, time 
and place of collection (particularly production areas with surpluses or clusters of processing 
units), delivery locations with an indication of the guaranteed minimum price at the start of the 
year, as well as the payment terms for suppliers.” 
 
Rules for using the RR  
Each ECOWAS Member State can ask for using the RR for free (in the name of regional solidarity) 
up a certain amount, providing that this Member State is facing a food crisis. This amount (now 
called the country ‘quota’) has been calculated following the methodology used to calibrate the 
size of the RR. The annual needs of the country in case of crisis have been estimated (in 2012) by 
taking the % of population affected by the major crisis experienced by this country since 2000, by 
multiplying this % to the estimated population for 2020 and by applying the WFP norm (needs = 
15 kg per head per month). Then, it has been assumed that 3 months of these annual needs should 
be met regionally for landlocked countries and 1.5 months for coastal countries (the estimated 
delays in mobilizing international aid).     
As we already mentioned it, it has been considered 33% of the needs to be met regionally should 
be met by the RR and 67% by national PS. However, the figure of 33% is only an average as the 
“principle of solidarity […] calls for the Regional Reserve to provide more support to those 
countries most exposed to risks of shocks that affect consumption, and particularly those states 
which lack the sufficient financial or physical resources to reduce the risks or mitigate the impact 
of these shocks.” A typology of countries was therefore elaborated depending on whether they are 
coastal or landlocked and LDCs or non-LDCs. For landlocked LDCs (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), 
40% of the needs are covered by the country quota, whereas for countries landlocked or LDC this 
percentage is 20% and only 10% for coastal non-LDCs (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria) (ECOWAS 
2012, table 5 p. 40) 
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The resulting country quotas are provided in table 5 below.  
Table 5. Country quotas 
 
Source : our calculus based on ECOWAS (2012). See table A1 in annex for the detailed calculus. 
 
Note that countries can get their quota from the RR only if they are facing a food crisis. What 
happens when the RR agency receives a query from (one or several) governments of ECOWAS 
Member States? The assessment and decision are informed by vulnerability analyzes, ideally 
conducted within the framework of the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (CHB). The CHB framework is the 
methodology developed by the CILSS and adopted by the region for monitoring food insecurity 
(theoretically it allows comparing the food security level of different countries). However, this 
kind of food security assessment is not available for all countries (some of them do not have an 
early warning system, EWS). That is the reason why the RR project considers that “upgrading of 
information systems and the widespread application of CHB is required as soon as possible” 
(ECOWAS, 2012). Then, the mobilization of the reserve is triggered by a decision of the 
Management Committee of the RR.  
If resources are available in the RR, countries can ask more than their quotas but in this case, they 
have to pay. Note that the RR first satisfies the demand expressed by the countries within their 
quotas before considering sales or reimbursable loans to governments, international 
humanitarian organizations, NGOs or POs (ECOWAS 2012, p. 31). 
The food received by governments should be used for sales at fair prices or targeted free 
distribution. The financial resources received should be used to finance food vouchers or cash 
transfers but also to trigger the use of national PS (in West Africa, national PS can be used only if 
there is a fund to replenish the stock from the quantity released).   
Country quotas 
(tons)
Country quotas 
(% of the RR size)
Benin 2074 0,5%
Burkina Faso 71766 17,4%
Cape Verde 324 0,1%
Côte d’Ivoire 2205 0,5%
Gambia 3632 0,9%
Ghana 2729 0,7%
Guinea 2298 0,6%
Guinea-Bissau 650 0,2%
Liberia 3022 0,7%
Mali 85023 20,7%
Niger 211829 51,5%
Nigeria 18348 4,5%
Senegal 5039 1,2%
Sierra Leone 1292 0,3%
Togo 1322 0,3%
ECOWAS 411554 100,0%
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Institutional framework: the reserve’s governance bodies 
After analyzing different scenarios, the choice has been made to establish a specific body 
dedicated to the management of the reserve but inserted into ECOWAP (ECOWAP is ECOWAS 
agricultural policy).  
 
2.4. Funding strategy 
Cost of the RR project 
The cost for the constitution of the RR (initial allocations of physical and financial capital) and its 
maintenance (technical management of the physical and financial reserves) are shown on table 6 
below. More detailed data are provided in table A.3 in annex. The cost of building and governing 
the reserve is estimated to be $263 million over eight years, meaning an average of $33 
million/year. These costs vary widely from year to year because of the phased increase of the 
physical and financial capital.” (ECOWAS 2012)9.  
The cost of increasing the level of national PS from their current level (estimated to 227,000 tons) 
to 841,000 tons has been estimated to be around $3 million over eight years10. 
 
Table 6: Cost of the RR project (in 1,000 US$) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Total 
Constitution of the RR 92 4 2 4 63 6 3 69 243 
Physical Reserve 31 5 4 5 24 9 6 31 115 
Financial Reserve 61 -2 -2 -2 39 -3 -3 38 129 
Maintenance of the RR  3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 20 
Cost of regional solidarity 
interventions of RR  
(75% mobilized each year) 
67 67 67 67 110 110 110 152 747 
Cost of regional solidarity 
interventions of RR  
(100% mobilized each year) 
89 89 89 89 146 146 146 203 996 
Increase of national PS 0 453 453 453 410 410 410 368 2 959 
Total Cost  
(if 75% mobilized each year) 161 526 524 526 586 529 526 591 3 970 
Total Cost  
(if 100% mobilized each year) 183 548 547 548 622 565 562 642 4 219 
Source: adapted from ECOWAS (2012), p. 95 and 100.  
 
The cost associated with RR interventions (reconstitution of the physical and financial capital after 
they have been mobilized to help resolve food crises) at RR maturity (from the eighth year), is 
estimated to be equal to $152 million per year (if the RR mobilized only 75% of its financial and 
physical reserves) and to $202.7 million dollars per year (if it mobilized 100%)11.   
                                                             
9 See ECOWAS (2012), pp. 86-91 for more details on the way these costs have been estimated. 
10 See ECOWAS (2012), pp. 98-100 for more details on the way these costs have been estimated. 
11 See ECOWAS (2012), pp. 91-95 for more details on the way these costs have been estimated. 
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This means that over the 8-years initial period of building of the RR and increase of national PS, 
the total cost is likely to be between $3.97 billion and $4.21 billion. Then, the cost of the RR project 
(interventions of the RR + maintenance) will be between $154 and 205 million/year depending if 
75% or 100% of the RR are mobilized every year in the name of regional solidarity (i.e. without 
any matching contribution from the recipient country or another institution). 
 
Funding of the RR Project 
The proposed financing structure to cover the constitution and maintenance cost of the RR is 
shown on table 7 below. Basically the idea is that 2/3 of this cost will be covered by regional 
resources and 1/3 by the TPFs. The region contribution is supposed to be made by countries (in 
the form grains) and RECs (ECOWAS and WAEMU). However, until now only the TPFs provided 
their contribution (the on-going purchases of the first tons of grain are funded by the EU). The EU 
committed itself to provide 60 million euros for the RR (within the 11th FED). In a current EU 
project (56 million euros), 38 million euros are provided to support the RR, among which 20 
million euros are devoted to grain purchases12. With a price of 400 euro / ton (delivered in public 
warehouses), these 20 million euros are equivalent to 50 000 tons of grain.  
 
Table 7: Proposed financing structure for the constitution and maintenance cost of the RR 
 
Source : ECOWAS (2012), p. 98. 
 
The financing structure proposed to cover the cost of RR interventions and the increase in national 
PS is given by table 8 below. Again the idea is that the majority of the funding should stem from 
the region (almost ¾ of the cost). In order to do this, ECOWAS should create “a predictable, secure 
and supportive financial mechanism”. The proposal mechanism is a new tax on imports. This tax 
would be called "Zero Hunger tax" and its rate would be 0.5% of the value of all imports (except 
maybe food imports). It would be collected in the same way as the already perceived CET. 
However, for now, the Zero Hunger tax has not been implemented (nor alternative measures such 
as taxing flight tickets or phone communications).  
                                                             
12 In addition to the 38 million euros devoted to supporting the RR, 18 million euros have been provided for 
improving information systems, especially early warning system (EWS) that are in charge to produce data on the 
state of country food insecurity by using the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (CHB). This improvement of EWS is 
necessary in order to allow comparing the food security level of different countries and thereby making a fair 
decision in case several countries compete to use the RR.  
Thousand $ Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Total Years 1 
to 8 
Coasts set-up, maintenance and 
governance of the total reserve 94 807,00     6 168,00     4 429,00     6 168,00     65 930,00     8 713,00       5 742,00       71 299,00     263 257,00  
State contributions (grains) 15 000,00     12 000,00     15 000,00     42 000,00     
ECOWAS/WAEMU Contributions 20 000,00     15 000,00   15 000,00   15 000,00   15 000,00     15 000,00     15 000,00     15 000,00     125 000,00  
Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) 
contributions 12 000,00     12 000,00   12 000,00   12 000,00   12 000,00     12 000,00     12 000,00     12 000,00     96 000,00     
Annual balance (resources-usage) 47 807,00 -    20 832,00   22 571,00   20 832,00   26 930,00 -    18 287,00     21 258,00     29 299,00 -    257,00 -         
Contributions to funding :
a. % Région + countries 74% 56% 56% 56% 69% 56% 56% 71% 63%
b. % TFPs 26% 44% 44% 44% 31% 44% 44% 29% 37%
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Table 8: Proposed financing structure to cover the costs of RR interventions + the increase in 
national PS 
 
Source : ECOWAS (2012), p. 100 
 
2.5. Internal coherence of the RR project 
We have seen the objectives of the RR project are: 
 Improving the management of food crises in West Africa 
 Promoting the food sovereignty of the region and Member States 
 Increasing the solidarity between Member States 
Are the proposed infrastructures, rules and procedures and funding mechanisms coherent with 
these objectives, taking into account the already existing tools (policy background)? Let us discus 
this point objective by objective. 
Improving the management of food crises in West Africa. Based on the assumption that the delays 
in mobilizing international aid are a major problem in managing food crisis in West Africa (we will 
see in the next chapter that this assumption is highly justified given the experience of past food 
crises), the RR project aims to build the means for the region to manage food crises during 3 
months for Sahel landlocked countries and 1.5 months for costal countries. Taking into account 
the current low level of national PS, it planned to create a regional reserve and to increase national 
PS. The RR will be made mainly by the staples most consumed by the poors (millet, sorghum, 
maize and gari), the storage sites will be located near the main spots of food crises and the 
indicator chosen to allocate the RR (based on the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié) seems relevant as it 
allows comparing the level of food insecurity of different countries.  The content of the RR project 
seems therefore to be coherent with its objective of improving the management of food crises, 
providing that the delays in mobilizing international aid is an important part of the problem (what 
seems to be true as we will see in the next chapter) and that the means provided in the form of 
increased national PS and rights to use the RR are correctly used by national governments. The 
main concerns are therefore not on coherence but on implementation: until now the RR is not in 
place, national PS have not been increased and the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié is not used by all the 
countries of the region.  
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8-years total 
Cost of intervention by the 
total reserve (75% mobilized 
each year) (thousands of 
dollars) 66 515,00  66 515,00     66 515,00     66 515,00     109 658,00   109 658,00   109 658,00   152 004,00   747 038,00      
Contributionby "Zero Hunger" 
(0,5%) -              390 000,00  390 000,00  390 000,00  390 000,00   390 000,00   390 000,00   390 000,00   2 730 000,00  
Total regional resources 
(thousands of dollars) -              390 000,00  390 000,00  390 000,00  390 000,00   390 000,00   390 000,00   390 000,00   2 730 000,00  
Contribution by  G20 partners 
and et other partners (limited 
to one-third of regional 
resources  in years  2 to 8) 
thousands of $) 66 515,00  130 000,00  130 000,00  130 000,00  130 000,00   130 000,00   130 000,00   130 000,00   976 515,00      
Total resources thousands of $) 66 515,00  520 000,00  520 000,00  520 000,00  520 000,00   520 000,00   520 000,00   520 000,00   3 706 515,00  
Allocation to national food 
reserve strategies (national 
and local stocks) (thousands of 
dollars) -              453 485,00  453 485,00  453 485,00  410 342,00   410 342,00   410 342,00   367 996,00   2 959 477,00  
Percentage of resources 
allocated: 
a. to the Régiona Reserve (%) 100% 13% 13% 13% 21% 21% 21% 29% 20%
b. to the national food reserve 
strategy (%) 0% 87% 87% 87% 79% 79% 79% 71% 80%
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Promoting the food sovereignty of the region and Member States. At first glance, it seems that the 
contribution of the RR project to improving the sovereignty of the region is rather limited: its 
ambition is not to substitute for international aid but only to manage the crises during the delays 
for mobilizing international aid. Moreover, in the proposed financing structure, the TFPs play an 
important role, although the main part of the funding is supposed to stem for the regional 
resources. We will see in the next chapter that things are in fact more complex. On the other side, 
the RR project fully respects the sovereignty of the Member States (following the subsidiarity 
principle): during the next eight years, the majority of the funds is supposed to be used for 
increasing national PS. Moreover, the RR will not be used for interventions decided at the regional 
level: its aim is only to increase the means of national governments when their country is affected 
by a food crisis. The RR project also provide secondary benefits to food sovereignty by promoting 
i) the use of local staples when managing food crises (millet, sorghum, maize, milled cassava also 
called gari), thereby respecting consumer habits and preferences and ii) the procurement on the 
local market (including direct purchases to producer organizations).      
Increasing the solidarity between Member States. By nature the RR is based on the solidarity of the 
countries of the region with the countries hit by food crises. This form of solidarity is 
implemented through the ‘mutualization’ of the RR (each country contribute; only those in crisis 
benefit: the right to use the reserve is triggered by country food insecurity indicators based on the 
Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié). But the RR Project also encompasses two other forms of solidarity. The 
first one is the solidarity with the countries vulnerable to food crises, as both the planned 
increase in national PS (funded by regional solidarity) and the quantity each country can get from 
the reserve for free (in the name of regional solidarity) both depend on its vulnerability to food 
crises. As presented above, the vulnerability has been estimated based on i) the percentage of 
population hit during the main shock recorded since 2000 and ii) the delay in mobilizing 
international food aid (1.5 months for coastal countries and 3 months for landlocked countries). 
The third form of solidarity is with poor and landlocked countries, as these countries have a 
higher percentage of their needs covered (40% for LDC and landlocked countries, 20% for LDC or 
landlocked countries, 10% for coastal non-LDC countries). Moreover, as the major part of the cost 
of the RR Project (use of the RR and increase in national PS) is supposed to be funded through 
Zero Hunger tax on country extra-ECOWAS total imports, non-LDC coastal countries (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria) will be the main contributors. This three forms of solidarity result in 
concentrating the solidarity on Sahel countries (and among them on Niger), as these countries are 
the most often hit by food crisis, the most vulnerable to food crises and are all landlocked and LDC 
countries. The magnitude of the joint effect of the two last forms of solidarity can be visualized on 
figures 4 and 5 below. 
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Fig. 4. Solidarity regarding the right to use the RR in the name of regional solidarity
 
Source: our calculus based on ECOWAS (2012), see table A.1 in annex for details 
 
Fig. 5. Solidarity regarding the funding by the region of the increase in national PS 
 
Source: our calculus based on ECOWAS (2012), see table A.1 in annex for details 
 
But, off course, internal coherence is not all. We also have to check whether the RR project 
provides an adequate response to the dynamics of food crises in West Africa.  
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3. DISCUSSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE RR PROJECT WITH THE DYNAMICS OF 
FOOD CRISES IN WEST AFRICA  
In this chapter, we will go beyond internal coherence by questioning whether the RR project is 
adequate, given the specific characteristics of food crises in West Africa. We will begin by 
analyzing the drivers and mechanisms of food crisis in West African, thereby identifying the three 
main crisis scenarios that may occur (and have occurred) in West Africa. We will then consider an 
example for each crisis scenario (a recent crisis) and try to imagine what might have been the 
contribution of the RR project to improving, food sovereignty, solidarity and food security.  
As already said in the introduction, we will analyze the potential contribution the RR Project at its 
full maturity level, i.e. with i) increased national PS (840,000 tons instead of 227,000 tons) and ii) 
the RR made of a physical stock of 140,000 tons and a financial stock equivalent to 271,000 tons. 
In order to acknowledge the fact that the RR Project may be only partially implemented because 
of financing problems, we will consider alternative scenarios where i) the RR is built without any 
increase in the level of national PS and ii) the RR is undersized.  
 
3.1. The economics of food crises in West Africa  
Food crises and malnutrition 
Malnutrition is a chronic problem in West Africa, especially in Sahel countries whose malnutrition 
rates are among the highest in the world (see table A.4 in annex). These nutritional problems 
(measured by insufficient weight for height –wasting- or insufficient height for age –stunting- are 
not only related to food consumption issues but also to health problems (e.g. diarrheas, malaria). 
In addition to chronic malnutrition, when West-African countries (especially Sahel countries) face 
food crises, malnutrition rates increase sharply (see figure 6 below for the example of Burkina 
Faso).  
Figure 6. Dynamics of wasting in Burkina Faso  
 
Source: UNICEF-WHO-World Bank 
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As can be seen on this graph, in Burkina Faso, the prevalence of children under 5 wasting is 
between 10% and 15% in normal years. When a crisis occurs (as was the case in the Sahel in 2002 
and 2005), this rate jumps above 20% the following year (it almost reached 25% after the 2005 
crisis). Note also that the prevalence of severe wasting jumps as well with crises: its level in 
normal time is between 2% and 6%but in periods of crisis it can jump above 10%. The most 
probable is that children falling into severe wasting with crises were children suffering from 
moderated wasting in normal times. For the case of the 2005 crisis, this means that the crisis 
resulted in shifting 10% of the households from normal weight to height to moderate wasting and 
in shifting 7% of the households from moderate to severe wasting. 
Food crises are therefore very damaging for food security. Moreover, their frequency is high: since 
2000, five food crises have been registered in Sahel countries: 2002-2003, 2005, 2008, 2010 (for 
Niger only) and 2012. The choice of the RR project to focus on managing food crises is therefore 
fully justified. In order to understand what can be the contribution of this project to better 
managing food crises, we have to understand the drivers and mechanisms of food crisis in West 
Africa.  
 
The mechanisms of food crises 
The two drivers of food crisis. Food crisis occur when the access to food is sharply reduced for a 
significant share of the population. This reduction in access to food may in some occasion stem 
from a lack of availability of food in a specific area but, most of the time, it comes from a lack of 
economic access to food (Sen 1981). This lack of economic access to food may be provoked by a 
collapse in household livelihoods and/or a sharp increase in the price of foods, especially staples. 
Staples are the products that provide the cheapest calories (usually grains, roots or tubers). In 
West Africa, the main staples consumed are millet, sorghum, maize, rice, cassava and yams: they 
provide the major part of the caloric intake and account for a high share of households 
expenditures (see table 9 below).  
 
Table 9. In Mali, grain provides most of the calories in the diet and accounts for a significant share 
of household expenditures (for all social classes).  
  
Proportion of grain 
in dietary calories  
Proportion of grain in 
household food expenditures  
Proportion of grain in household 
total expenditures  
Average for rural 
households 
86.0% 51.1% 34.9% 
Average for the poorest 
20% of rural households 
88.6% 57.6% 44.3% 
Average for the richest 20% 
of rural households 
82.0% 44.1% 26.5% 
Average for urban 
households 
73.1% 31.9% 18.4% 
Average for the poorest 
20% of urban households 
78.6% 38.5% 27.3% 
Average for the richest 20% 
of urban households 
68.0% 27.4% 13.6% 
Source: Bocoum (2011) 
 
20 
 
When the prices of these staples increase, households may react by reducing their consumption 
of staples (with the risk of deficiencies in calories) but also, in order to maintain their calories 
consumption level, by reducing their consumption of other foods (but with the risk of provoking 
deficiencies in micronutrients) or their health expenditures (what may affect their nutritional 
status). 
Household livelihoods may collapse for many different reasons. Shocks affecting at the same time 
a high number of households may stem from natural disasters (earthquakes, droughts, floods, 
cyclones, etc.), macroeconomic shocks or political events (civil wars, social troubles etc.). In West 
Africa, the main shocks affecting household livelihoods are clearly related to droughts (which hit 
mainly Sahel countries) although other type of shocks also played a role such as locust attacks, 
Ebola outbreak, exchange rate movements (like the devaluation by 50% of the FCFA in 1994) or 
political troubles (civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, jihadists movements in Mali and northern Nigeria)13.  
Droughts usually lead to reducing the livelihoods of farmers (surplus farmer have less to sell; 
deficit farmers have more to buy) but also of pastoralists. Many animals die or lose weight because 
of the lack of water and pasture. The price of animals usually goes down because i) they became 
thinner and ii) pastoralists sell more animals (as it is currently complicated and expensive to feed 
them) thereby increasing the animal supply on the market. From farmers and pastoralists (the 
first categories hit), the food crisis may widespread to their employees (e.g. agricultural workers) 
and clients.   
When staple prices surge, other categories are hit by the crisis (e.g. urban consumers), as all grain 
sellers are affected. Staple prices may surge within a country because of i) bad harvests in the 
country or the region, ii) spikes in international prices and/or iii) decrease in the country 
exchange rate (that increases the price cost of imports from the international or regional market). 
In all cases, the effect is not automatic: the reduction in availability of staples provoked by bad 
harvests may be compensated by trade or stocks and the increase in import price cost may be 
more or less transmitted within the country. In West Africa, the main sources of sharp increase in 
the price of staples are i) droughts (and to some extent locust attacks) which affect the harvests 
of the main grain produced in the Sahel region (millet, sorghum) and ii) spikes in the international 
price of rice (as occurred in 2008).  
When the harvest of millet and sorghum is bad in a given country, the resulting deficit may be 
compensated by the regional trade of millet and sorghum. This is exactly what occurred in Niger 
in 2010: the deficit has been compensated by massive imports from northern Nigeria, allowing 
grain prices to remain stable in Niger. However, most of the time, droughts affect all Sahel 
countries at the same time (as happened in 2005 and 2012). In this case, there cannot be 
compensations of surpluses and deficit and the price of millet, sorghum and maize increase a lot 
in Sahel countries. To some extent, the regional trade of maize can contribute to regulating grain 
prices in the Sahel (contrary to millet and sorghum that are only produced in Sahel countries and 
in the northern regions of coastal countries, maize is also produced in coastal areas that are much 
less exposed to droughts). However, as observed during the 2012 crisis, maize imports from 
coastal countries are likely to stop only the raise in maize price, without being able to stabilize the 
price of millet and sorghum (see figure 7 below).  
                                                             
13 The current food crisis in Borno State (in the north-east of Nigeria) is related to the “conflict between Boko 
Haram and the Nigerian Armed Forces” and the “very high staple food price due to the declining value of the 
Nigerian Naira (FEWSNET, 2016).  
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Fig 7. Dynamics of grain prices in Bamako, Mali 
 
Source: OMA 
 
Another regulating mechanism is provided by international trade (rice imports). As can be seen 
on figure 7 above, in 2005, the increase in the price of millet and sorghum was stopped when it 
almost reached the price of imported rice. The price of imported rice therefore plays the role of a 
ceiling for the price of coarse grains (millet, sorghum and maize). However, as rice is usually much 
more expensive than coarse grains, rice imports do not provide a mean to keep the prices of millet 
and sorghum at reasonable levels (in 2005, the prices of millet and sorghum increased by 150%!). 
Therefore, regional and international trade do not provide effective means to mitigate increases 
in the price of millet and sorghum in Sahel countries, except when bad harvests occurred in a 
single country. Private stocks would be another regulating mechanism. However, the level is 
usually low in the region (traders and farmers do have seasonal stocks but are reluctant to store 
for the next year, as it is a highly risky activity). The last regulating mechanism rests on public 
stocks but, as we have seen, their level is extremely low (usually less than 3 days of consumption). 
When the price of rice surges on international markets, the price of imported rice increases in the 
region. That is what occurred in 2008: the transmission has been partial and delayed (David-Benz 
et al. 2010), partly thanks to import tax removals (Galtier et al. 2009), but at the end of the day the 
price of imported rice increased by 33% (the international price converted in FCFA increased by 
100%). Maybe more important for food security issues, this increase in the price of imported rice 
generated an increase in the demand of coarse grain that pulled up their price (see figure 8 below). 
As all the countries of the region have been affected at the same time by this increase in the 
demand for coarse grain, regional trade has been unable to mitigate the increase in their price. 
The resulting dynamics of grain prices in Sahel countries is shown on figure 8 below.  
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Fig. 8. Dynamics of grain prices in Bamako (Mali), Niamey (Niger) and Ouagadougou (Burkina 
Faso) 
 
Sources: OMA for Bamako and GIEWS for Niamey and Ouagadougou 
 
It therefore appears that when a scarcity of millet and sorghum occurs (provoked by a bad harvest 
at the regional scale or by an increase in the demand resulting from a sharp increase in the price 
of rice), the regional trade is not able to contain the surge in millet and sorghum prices. This gives 
some arguments in favor of PS made of millet and sorghum and located in Sahel countries or in 
the northern regions of coastal countries.    
Consequences of collapses in livelihoods and increased staple prices. Both phenomena result in 
reducing the access to food to some categories of the population:  farmers and pastoralists if the 
reduction in livelihoods is provoked by a drought and all grain buyers when grain prices increase. 
When the two phenomena play together, deficit grain farmers and pastoralists are hit twice as 
their livelihoods are reduced and the cost of the staples they need is higher: deficit farmers have 
to buy more grain at a higher price; pastoralists have less means to buy more expensive grains. 
The situation can be even worse as the two dynamics (reduction in livelihoods and increase in 
grain price) may interact and reinforce each other: when the price of grain goes up, pastoralists 
have to sell more animals to get the same quantity of grain, thereby increasing even more the 
animal supply, pushing down even more animal prices and finally reducing even more their 
livelihoods; reciprocally, when households become poorer, they demand for the cheapest sources 
of calories (grains) may increase, thereby pushing up even more the price of grains.   
Household coping strategies. When facing a collapse in their livelihoods or a sharp increase in the 
price of staples, households develop coping strategies based on developing new activities to 
increase their income (work as agricultural worker in the first of richer farmers, migration to less 
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affected regions or countries or to the cities…), selling assets (with the risk of reducing their 
resilience to future crises) or adjusting their consumption pattern (with many potential 
consequences on nutrition if the quantity of calories or nutrients consumed is reduced or if the 
health of household members is affected). Note that the strategies based on migration or selling 
assets are less effective when the food crisis also affect the neighboring countries (as in this case 
it is more difficult to find job opportunities and the price of assets –such as animals- is likely to fall 
more).  
 
A typology of food crisis in West Africa 
We saw that the main shocks that provoked food crises in West Africa are droughts in the Sahel 
area and spikes in the international price of rice. We also saw that droughts usually affect the 
livelihoods of farmers and pastoralist and may generate a surged in the price of grain in Sahel 
countries (especially when the drought affect all the Sahel area, as in this case regional trade is 
ineffective in mitigating grain price increases). Finally we saw that spikes in the international 
price of rice affect all countries of West Africa and do not only result in increased prices for 
imported rice: because of consumer’s substitutions, the price of coarse grains (millet, sorghum 
and maize) is likely to be pulled-up (as occurred in 2008).     
Acknowledging these facts, we identified three food crisis scenarios for West Africa. In the first 
crisis scenario (CS1), the crisis stems from bad harvests of millet, sorghum and maize in a single 
(Sahel) country. Thanks to regional trade, grain prices are likely to remain stable. The crisis is 
therefore driven by the collapse in farmer and pastoralist livelihoods.  This is the scenario of the 
2010 crisis in Niger. In the second crisis scenario (CS2), the crisis stems from bad harvests of 
millet, sorghum and maize in the major part of their production area (Sahel countries and the 
northern regions of coastal countries). Coarse grain prices increase sharply (especially for millet 
and sorghum as the increase in the price of maize may be mitigated by maize imports from coastal 
regions). The crisis is therefore driven both by a strong reduction in farmer and pastoralist 
livelihoods and by an increase in grain prices. This is the most frequent scenario in the region (the 
last examples are the 2005 and 2012 crises in the Sahel). In the last crisis scenario (CS3), the crisis 
stems from a rice price spike on the international market. It affects all countries of West Africa. In 
this case, household livelihoods are not affected but the price of all grains increases (both rice and 
coarse grains). This is the scenario of the 2008 crisis. The effect of these different types of crisis 
on grain prices are illustrated on figure 8 above. Their main characteristics are summarized in 
table 10 below. 
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Table 10. Characteristics of the three main crisis scenarios 
 Crisis scenario 
Characteristics of 
the crisis 
CS1 CS2 CS3 
 
Shock that 
provoked the crisis 
Bad harvests of millet 
and sorghum in a single 
(Sahel) country 
Bad harvests of millet 
and sorghum in all the 
Sahel area 
Sharp increase in the 
international price of rice 
Drivers Collapse in farmer and 
pastoralist livelihoods 
Collapse in farmer and 
pastoralist livelihoods 
+ Increase in grain 
prices 
Increase in grain prices 
Extension One (Sahel) country Sahel countries + 
northern regions of 
coastal countries 
Sahel countries + coastal 
countries 
Recent examples Niger 2010 crisis 2005 and 2012 crises in 
the Sahel  
2008 crisis 
 
What may be the contribution of the RR Project to improving the management of these different 
types of crises?  In order to answer this question, let us consider an example for each crisis 
scenario and try to imagine what may have changed if the RR Project had already been 
implemented when the crisis occurred. This is a rather speculative thought experiment but it can 
be useful to draw lessons on what can be expected from the RR project. We will consider 
successively the cases of Niger 2010 crisis, Niger 2005 crisis and the 2008 crisis in West Africa.  
 
3.2. Potential benefits of the RR Project to managing a type 1-crisis (bad 
harvest in a single country) 
In this section, we will analyze the potential role of the RR for managing a type 1-crisis. The 
analysis will be based on the experience of Niger 2010 crisis: we will first present the story of the 
crisis before trying to imagine what may have change if the RR project had been already 
implemented at that time. 
 
The story of Niger 2010 crisis 
The crisis was provoked by a drought that led both to a very bad grain harvest in Niger and to a 
lack of pasture and water for animals.  It has been estimated that “more than 40% of villages had 
lost more than half of the main rainfed harvest” (Wiggins et al. 2012, p. 11) and that the deficit in 
pasture was equivalent to 67% of the needs (Michiels et al. 2011a). However, as the harvest was 
pretty good in the neighboring countries, the grain deficit was compensated through massive 
imports: it has been estimated that from February (therefore very early in the marketing year) 
“between half and two-thirds of food available on markets, particularly in the west of Niger, was 
imported” (p. 12). Maybe for that reason, grain prices remain stable (at a rather high level anyway, 
see figure 8 above). The main effects of the crisis have been a strong reduction in the livelihoods 
of farmers (decrease in harvests) and pastoralists (increased animal morbidity and mortality, 
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increased fodder prices and sharp reduction in the value of animals). Households coping 
strategies have been mainly based on worker migration (more and sooner than usual), in moving 
animals south (one month earlier than usual) and in adjusting food consumption (eating leaves, 
ant-food etc.).  
The policy response has been massive (more than 200 billion FCFA according to Michiels et al. 
2011b) and diversified (Michiels et al. 2012). It has been based on food transfers (free 
distributions, sales at a subsidized price, food for work), cash transfers (including cash for work), 
input transfers (seeds, inputs for animals) and measures for the nutritional recovery of young 
children and women. In monetary terms, the main component of the policy response has been 
related to nutritional measures: more than 580,000 children and about 60,000 women have been 
treated in recovery centers, whereas a blanket feeding has been distributed to 678,000 children 
(nutritional measures accounted for more than 60% of the 200 billion FCFA used to manage the 
crisis). Regarding the other components (transfers), the amount of food transferred (grains and 
beans) has been estimated to 260,000 tons whereas the amount of other transfers (cash and 
inputs) was around 25 billion of FCFA (equivalent to 100,000 tons of millet at the then prevailing 
market price).  
 
The great majority of the aid has been channeled through UN agencies: the national scheme has 
rapidly been short of means and the international aid has been managed by UN organization and 
NG0s, as required by their procedures14.  
The general feeling of experts is that the policy response has been adequate both in its magnitude 
and in its modalities (diversity of actions implemented, acknowledging the fact the crisis was 
multi-dimensional)… but delayed. In spite of early warnings (it was obvious since October 2009 
that the grain harvest was really bad in Niger and in December 2009, FEWS estimated that “about 
20% of the population were likely to be severely food insecure and an additional 40% moderately 
food insecure in 2010”), emergency interventions have been low until early March (when they 
were scaled up) and then still too limited until May 2010 when they were scaled up again. The 
reasons for this delay are related to the political context: president Tandja (who at that time was 
in conflicts with the donors, following the constitutional change that allowed him to stay at power) 
was reluctant to recognize the magnitude of the crisis. It is only after the military coup of 18 
February, that the new government appealed (on 10 March) for “massive support to the enormous 
efforts Niger is making to cope with famine”. But the reasons of the delay in the policy response 
are also linked to the donors whose attention was diverted by the January 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti and floods in Pakistan15.   
This delay resulted in sharp increase in the percentage of wasted children in all regions of Niger 
(see figure 9 below), therefore requiring massive nutritional recovery programs.  
  
                                                             
14 Anyway, it seems that the coordination of interventions between the government and external partners 
has been better than in 2005. 
15 “Some agencies were reported as transferring Francophone staff from West Africa following the January 
earthquake in Haiti.” (Wiggins et al. 2012, p. 15). 
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Fig. 9. Children under-five wasting increased sharply during the Niger 2010 crisis  
 
Source: Wiggins et al. (2012), p. 13 
 
What may have been the effect of the RR Project?  
Would have the RR Project already been implemented what may have changed in the way Niger 
2010 crisis has been managed? The main problems were i) the too long response delays and ii) 
the lack of food sovereignty of Niger when massive international aid has been provided through 
UN organizations and international NGOs.  
Had the RR Project already been implemented, the Niger government would have had in hands a 
much bigger PS16. It would not have had access to the RR anyway: following the change in the 
Niger constitution, Niger was temporarily excluded from ECOWAS bodies. It is only in February 
or March 2010 (after the coup d’état) that Niger government would have been able to ask for using 
the RR.  
It seems quite realistic to assume that, with more means to manage it, the government would have 
been more willing to recognize sooner the intensity of the crisis: as we already mentioned it, 
president Tandja was in conflict with the donors at that time and therefore reluctant to recognize 
a crisis that could only be managed by international aid. Would have the Niger government 
recognized sooner the reality of the crisis, it may have shortened the delay in mobilizing 
international aid (it has been reported that “some international agencies were wary of 
contradicting the old government too strongly, fearing lack of cooperation, or even expulsion – for 
which there were precedents”, Wiggins et al. 2012, p. 15). Therefore, have more stocks would not 
have only provided more means to the government to manage the crisis during the delays in 
mobilizing food aid (what is the explicit objective of the RR project): it may also have reduced this 
delay. 
Acting sooner may have modified the nature of interventions as it may have reduced the needs for 
programs focused the nutritional recovery of children (these programs accounted for more than 
60% of the total cost of managing the crisis), thereby saving means to implement actions focused 
on increasing households livelihoods and resilience and improving medium-term food security. 
                                                             
16 The required level for Niger PS in 2020 is more than 317,000 (see table A.1). In 2010, when the crisis 
occurred, the theoretical level of PS were 80,000 tons for the physical stock (SNS) and the equivalent of 
30,000 tons for the financial stock (FSA), whereas their actual level were respectively 21,000 tons and the 
equivalent of 11,000 tons (Michiels et al. 2011b, pp. 45-46). 
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3.3. Potential benefit of the RR to managing a type 2-crisis (bad harvest in all 
Sahel area) 
In West Africa, this type of crisis is the most frequent one and probably the one which has the 
most damaging effect in terms of food security. Those who designed the RR Project probably had 
this scenario in mind. The most recent crises of this type are the 2005 and 2012 crisis that hit all 
Sahel countries and the northern regions of coastal countries. To analyze the potential effect of 
the RR Project on this type of crisis, we will take the example of Niger 2005 crisis which offer the 
advantage to be directly comparable with Niger 2010 crisis17.  
The story of Niger 2005 crisis 
The 2005 crisis was also provoked by a drought. Although the magnitude of the shocks were lower 
than in 2010 (the grain production fell by 12% compared to 31% in 201018 and the pasture deficit 
was much lower, see figure 10 below), the consequences on food security have probably been 
worse. The main reason for this is the regional dimension of the crisis. Usually grain deficit in 
Niger (which are chronic but increases the years of bad harvest) are compensated by massive 
imports from northern Nigeria. However, in 2005, the grain harvest has also been really bad in 
Nigeria: grain prices were higher in northern Nigeria than in Niger, leading to a reversal of the 
usual side of trade. In addition, Mali and Burkina Faso closed their border with Niger. As a result, 
contrary to 2010 and in spite of the fact that the grain deficit in Niger was much lower, a boom in 
grain prices occurred in 2005 (see figure 8 above ). 
 Fig. 10. Dynamics of the pasture balance in Niger (in tons of equivalent dry matter) 
 
Source : Ministère du développement agricole (cited by Michiels et al. 2011b, p. 31) 
                                                             
17 Another advantage is that this crisis has been analyzed very carefully: see for instance Egg et al. (2006); 
Michiels et al. (2007) and Olivier de Sardan J.-P. (2007).   
18 Wiggins et al. (2012), p. 4 and Michiels et al. (2011b) p. 30 
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The sharp increase in grain prices resulted in more people being affected by the crisis (for instance 
urban consumers) and in deficit farmers and pastoralist being affected both by the reduction in 
their livelihoods and by the increase in the cost of grains. As in 2010, affected actors developed 
coping strategies (migration of workers, moving animals south, eat leaves or ant-food, reduce 
household non-food expenditure etc.) that proved to be insufficient to avoid surge in malnutrition 
rates19. 
 
As in 2010 (and even more), the policy response was delayed in 2005 in part for the same reason 
as we will see. The main difference with 2010 is that in 2005 early warning has been deficient: 
although it has been correctly estimated since October 2004 that the production deficit will be 
around 500,000 to 600,000 tons (compared to the normal deficit of 200,000 to 300,000 tons), the 
common belief was that, as usual, this deficit will be compensated by grain imports from Northern 
Nigeria. In addition, prior to the December elections, the government was reluctant to appeal for 
huge international aid. The initial emergency plan of the Niger government was therefore limited 
both in its size (67,000 tons of grain) and its modalities (sales at a subsidized price instead of free 
distribution). Given the small size of the Stock National de Sécurité (23,000 tons), the Niger 
government requested (unsuccessfully) 78,100 tons from the WFP. The WFP did not answer 
positively partly because it shared the view that there will not be major problems (its own 
interventions were very low-scaled: from February to August the WFP planned to transfer 6,562 
tons of grain) but also because its attention was diverted by the tsunami in South-East Asia. 
Interventions were also delayed by the lack of grain: from the planned 67,000 tons of sales at 
subsidized price, only 25,000 tons have been actually sold. The perceptions on the intensity of the 
crisis began to change with the increase in grain prices (accelerated since February and even more 
since July) and even more (in May 2005) with data (disseminated by MSF) showing extremely 
high malnutrition rates. The 28 May the prime minister appealed to massive international aid.  But 
the response (of both the Niger government and the WFP) was delayed by the lack of grain. Getting 
grain on international market proved to be long and difficult: the 11,000 tons of sorghum 
purchased to India by the Niger government (in the second half of June) was supposed to arrive 
in the port of Cotonou (Benin) at the end of July and at that time the Niger government did not had 
the means to finance its transportation to Niger. At the same time the WFP was still missing grain. 
It is only in August and September that 81,500 tons of grain were distributed.  
 
Given the evolution of grain prices, in-kind transfers would clearly have been the best option. 
However, implementing such kind of transfers proved to be difficult because of the lack of grains. 
At the beginning of the agricultural year, the level of Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) was 23,000 
tons, much below its theoretical level of 50,000 tons. It also proved to be extremely difficult for 
the Niger authorities and the WFP to get grains on the national or regional market (lack of grain 
availability, lack of financial resources to pay almost twice the usual price, export bans 
implemented by neighboring countries). In June, Niger public stock (SNS) was exhausted due to 
the failure of its suppliers (private traders) to deliver the 30,000 tons they were supposed to 
deliver. At the same time, the WFP was living a quite similar situation, expecting the delayed 
delivery of the grain ordered to the Nigeria public stock agency. The WFP had therefore to convert 
its food for work programs on cash for work programs. Finally the Niger government ordered 
                                                             
19 Workers migration and remittances were less effective strategies than in 2010 because northern Nigeria 
was also hit in 2005.   
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sorghum to India (11,000 then additional 12,500 tons) but, as already mentioned, it proved to be 
long and difficult.  
 
Another characteristic of the 2005 crisis management is its destructuring effect on national 
institutions. The shift to generalized free distribution of food that occurred in July 2005 resulted 
in marginalizing the Niger institutions in charge of managing food crises. To some extent this is a 
‘mechanical’ effect of the shift to free distribution as according to donors’ procedures, they have 
to channel this kind of aid through the WFP or NGOs. But some funds that were initially targeted 
to Niger bodies were reoriented to the WFP to be used for free distribution. In addition, few or no 
formal collaboration were developed by humanitarian organization and Niger bodies in charge of 
food security (for instance, OCHA put in place an information system without developing any 
collaboration with the Niger early Warning System, see Egg et al. (2006) pp. 68-69).  
 
What may have been the effect of the RR Project? 
Contrary to the 2010 crisis, in 2005, the diagnostic of the crisis (early warning) has been deficient:  
the deficit has been correctly estimated but the effect of the (regional) crisis on regional trade 
(reversal of trade flows between Niger and Nigeria) has not been correctly anticipated. The 
regional diagnostic promoted by the RR Project (based on the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié) would 
probably have allowed ‘thinking regionally’ and anticipating better the magnitude of the crisis in 
Niger.   
Like in 2010, by putting more means in the hands of national governments,  the RR Project may 
have incentivized the Niger government to recognize much earlier the magnitude of the crisis (as 
we already mentioned it, prior to December elections, the government was reluctant to appeal for 
huge international aid). The RR Project would therefore have been likely to reduce the response 
delay (not only the implementation of interventions but also the decision). Like in 2010, this may 
have allowed managing better the crisis before the arrival of international aid (donors were 
diverted by the tsunami in Southeast Asia). Above of all, even more than in 2010, it would have 
allowed reducing the delay in mobilizing international aid: in 2005, international aid has been 
mobilized by MSF and other NGOs against the opposition of the Niger government (in July 2005, 
the Niger government was still reluctant to the shift in the nature of interventions toward free 
distribution of food because it implied less means for the Niger government and more means for 
the WFP).  
The RR Project may also have contributed to improving the adequacy of the response by allowing 
more distribution of millet and sorghum. As in 2005 (contrary to 2010), the availability of millet 
and sorghum on the regional market was highly reduced, food distributions have been made of 
grains imported on the international market (like rice) or replaced by cash transfers. Cash 
transfers may have contributed to exacerbating the surge in millet and sorghum prices. And 
distribution of rice are much less relevant in this context as distributions of millet and sorghum 
as they i) take more time (import timelines), ii) are more expensive, iii) do not fit with household 
preferences and habits (especially in Niger, it is less true for Mali and Burkina Faso) and, above 
all, iv) have much less downward effect on the prices of millet and sorghum (which are the grains 
most consumed by the poor). Implementing large distribution of millet and sorghum would have 
required having stocks and the RR project would have allowed this through the RR and the 
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planned increase in national PS. The need for more physical PS had been recognized by the Niger 
government after the crisis: it decided to increase the level of the SNS from 50,000 tons to 80,000 
tons.   
Like in 2010, acting sooner (and in this case by acting both on livelihoods and grain prices), may 
have reduced the need for costly nutritional  recovery programs thereby saving money for action 
less targeting on emergency and more on increasing livelihoods and resilience.  
The 2005 crisis also showed the need for a regionally-scaled response. Otherwise the food 
distributions in one country do not push down the domestic grain prices because they stimulate 
exports to neighboring countries. This kind of ‘spill-over effects’ may lead some countries to 
implement exports bans (as did Mali and Burkina Faso during the 2005 crisis). The regional 
approach developed by the RR Project is likely to reduce this kind of problems by increasing   the 
response capacity of all countries (increase of national PS + RR), thereby stimulating simultaneous 
interventions in situations of type 2–crisis. Moreover, the existence a regional solidarity through 
concrete policies (increase in national PS funded by the region + RR) is likely to discourage export 
bans.  
 
3.4. Potential effect of the RR to managing a type 3-crisis (sharp increase in 
international prices affecting all West-African countries) 
The story of the 2008 crisis 
The 2008 crisis has been provoked by the sharp increase the international price of rice that 
occurred in 2008. Contrary to Niger 2005 and 2010 crises, it has been managed mainly internally 
(by the governments) with very few international aid. All ECOWAS countries implemented more 
or less the same policies (Soulé et al. 2008): import tax removal, export bans, use of PS (for the 
countries that had PS) and development of input subsidies programs to stimulate the national 
grain production (GOANA in Senegal, ‘Initiative Riz’ in Mali,  ‘Initiative 3N’ in Niger etc.).   
Part of these measures were not legal and, more important, were not in line with regional 
solidarity. To mitigate the increase in the price of imported rice, almost all West African  countries 
not only removed the VAT on rice but also the tariff on rice imports what, for the case of  WAEMU 
countries was not legal (the level of the CET should theoretically be decided at the WAEMU 
level)20. More problematic, many countries banned their grain exports in order to reduce 
“leakages” through the neighboring countries. These measures were not legal for the case of 
WAEMU countries.  
To what extent were these measures effective in containing the increase in grain prices? This 
question has been particularly studied for the case of Mali. Export bans have often been 
circumnavigated as the governments of the region are at a loss to control their borders 
(smuggling, corruption etc.). Therefore grains exports have not been stopped, but transaction 
costs increased, leading to exacerbating the increase in the price of grains in West Africa (Diarra 
and Dembélé 2008; Staatz et al. 2008). PS sales or free distribution involved too small quantities to 
                                                             
20 At that time, the custom union was limited to WUEMU countries. It has been enlarged to all ECOWAS 
countries in January 2015.  
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have a significant effect on price (Galtier et al. 2009). Input subsidies programs, by nature, only can 
have a lagged effect. The extent to which the import tax removals were passed on by the importers 
in their selling price is still controversial, even when measures are taken for this purpose 
(contracts between the government and rice importers by which they commit themselves on a 
maximum selling price, monitoring system etc.). The main reason for being skeptical is that the 
rice import sector is highly concentrated (2 or 3 big importers in each country). However, it seems 
that in some occasion, when properly managed, import tax removals led to reductions in the price 
of imported rice (Galtier et al. 2009). As a matter of fact, being for the policies implemented or 
other reasons, the increase in the price of imported rice as been around + 33% in WAEMU 
countries whereas the international price converted in FCFA increased by 100%. The price of 
coarse grain (millet, sorghum, maize) usually increased in the same proportion because part of 
consumers’ substitutions.   
Another issue related to import tax removal is countries’ ability to remove taxes on rice imports 
for a long time as these taxes account for a significant share of their budget (Soulé et al., 2008).  
What may have been the effect of the RR Project? 
The RR is not suited to deal with the direct effect of this type of crisis, as rice only accounts for 5% 
of the staples stored in the RR physical reserve. Moreover, the price of rice in ECOWAS countries 
is strongly determined by the import price cost therefore difficult to influence by using PS.  
However, as we have seen before, in 2008, the increase in the price of imported rice pulled up the 
price of local staples (millet, sorghum, maize, gari etc.). The increase in their price has been further 
increased by export bans. By providing to the governments the means to implement in-kind 
transfers made of these staples, the RR may have usefully contributed in mitigating the increase 
in the price of local staples (and in discouraging export bans). 
 
3.5. Conclusion on the adequacy of the RR Project to the dynamics of food crises in 
West Africa   
The review of past experiences of West-Africa countries in managing food crises led us to highlight 
the relevance of the RR Project: 
 The focus on food crises seems to be justified: food crisis are frequent in West Africa, 
particularly in Sahel countries (during the last two decades, a food crisis occurred on 
average every 3 years) and very damaging for food security (although high levels of 
chronic malnutrition do also exist).  
 
 The focus on managing the delays in mobilizing international aid sounds relevant as well: 
during the Niger 2005 and 2010 crises, the attention of the international community was 
diverted by other crises (the tsunami in Southeast Asia 2005; the earthquake in Haiti in 
2010) and interventions were delayed a lot (less in 2010 than in 2005), leading to huge 
nutrition problems, especially for young children. Being able to act sooner is likely to 
reduce malnutrition problems, thereby reducing the need for costly nutritional recovery 
programs (as those implemented in Niger in 2005 and 2010). 
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 The focus on food sovereignty (depending less on international aid) also make sense:  the 
emergency aid provided by international organizations and NGOs during the Niger 2005 
crisis was very effective but it proved to be very destructuring for national institutions. 
This kind of problem led government to be reluctant to recognize food crises (as 
illustrated by Niger 2005 and 2010 crises), thereby increasing the delays for both national 
and international responses21. The approach of food sovereignty developed in the RR 
Project is also realistic as it acknowledges the fact that the region alone is not able to 
manage the food crises that occur in West Africa (at least the most severe ones). 
 
 The focus on solidarity between ECOWAS states also makes sense: some countries banned 
their exports during the 2005 and 2008 crises. Moreover, focusing the regional solidarity 
on Sahel countries (especially Niger) seems also to be relevant as these countries (Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Niger) are much more affected than the others by malnutrition and food crises. 
 
 The focus on stocks (increase in national PS, RR, cooperation between national PS through 
RESOGEST) also seems to be relevant: in 2005 and in 2008 more physical stocks of local 
staples would have allowed providing more in-kind transfers, thereby mitigating the 
increase in staple prices. Note that the composition off the physical component of the RR 
seems adequate as it is mainly made of local staples (especially millet and sorghum, and 
to some extent maize and gari, see section 2.2).   
 
 The regional approach. Niger 2005 crisis showed the need to ‘think regional’: neglecting 
the fact that northern Nigeria was also affected by the crisis (therefore less able to 
compensate Niger’s deficit) led to underestimate the gravity of the situation in Niger. The 
RR Project, by using the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié spontaneously lead to ‘think regional’. 
By increasing the means of ECOWAS country governments (increased national PS, right to 
use the RR), the RR Project is also likely to stimulate many simultaneous national 
responses when several countries are affected by a crisis, thereby helping to produce 
‘regional responses’ to ‘regional crises’.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
RR project lays in-between national policies and external aid (to complement them not substitute 
them). It is worth therefore questioning what could be its value added vis-à-vis international aid 
and vis-à-vis national policies, both in terms of its political objectives (enhancing country food 
sovereignty; developing the solidarity between ECOWAS Member countries) and in terms of food 
security. 
 
                                                             
21 For the same reason, it appears that the choice of the RR Project to support national governments by 
providing them additional means (increase in national PS, right to use the RR) instead of promoting 
interventions decided at ECOWAS level (principle of subsidiarity) is therefore relevant. 
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4.1. Potential value added by the RR project vis-à-vis international aid 
Potential effects on food sovereignty 
It is not our role to discuss the relevance of this objective but we can remark that it is grounded in 
past negative experiences, for instance the management of the 2005 Niger crisis by UN 
organizations and international NGOs which, although very effective in saving lives, had a very 
destructuring effect on the Niger national scheme to manage food crises (and more broadly on 
national institutions).  
The RR Project has realistic (therefore limited) ambitions in this area, as it only seeks to increase 
the means in the hands of Member States governments in order to allow them managing the food 
crisis during the delay necessary for mobilizing international aid. Moreover, the RR project itself 
will be partly funded by donors, although the majority of its resources should stem from the 
region. Note that the subsidiarity principle not only applies with the international community but 
also with ECOWAS bodies: the RR Project fully respects the Member States sovereignty as it aims 
increasing national PS and providing government with a right to use the RR until a certain level 
(country quota) and under the condition that the country is experiencing a food crisis (the 
diagnostic being based on the Cadre Harmonisé Bonfié). 
Potential benefits. Its main potential benefits are the following: 
 
 Governments are likely to be more involved in managing food crisis before the arrival of 
international aid, thereby increasing their abilities in this area (this is the explicit objective 
of the RR project).  
 Governments are likely to have more weight in co-managing the international aid, 
especially when there is a scarcity of local staples and when the government holds 
(physical) stocks. The 2005 crisis showed that WFP and other partners were interested in 
cooperating with the Niger government in order to get grains to distribute (although at 
that time the conflicting relationships between Niger governments and donors, especially 
the WFP impeded this potential cooperation to be effective) 
 The share of local staples in the aid provided is likely to be higher thanks to the RR Project: 
the RR is mainly made by local staples (millet accounts for 25%, sorghum for 24%, maize 
for 26% and gari for 14%) and the donors always have interest to use stocks of local 
staples when available in order to reduce the delays and the costs of their operations –
local staples are less expensive than rice and other grains imported from the international 
market). Therefore the aid provided is likely to fit better with consumers’ preferences and 
habits. 
 Local procurements of the RR are a w ay to support local production, all the more that the 
rule specify that local purchases should be preferred when possible (and that part of the 
procurement should be made directly with producer organizations).   
 
Challenges. However, all these potential benefits require the involvement of ECOWAS and 
Member States in the funding of the RR Project. However, until now, the only contributor to the 
building of the RR Project is the European Union: the Member Stated did not deliver the quantity 
of staples they were supposed to deliver to build the RR; the regional economic communities 
(ECOWAS and WAEMU) did not provided the money they were supposed to provide for the 
building of the RR; the Zero Hunger tax as not been created what compromises the planned 
increase in national PS and the ability of Member States to use the RR.   
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Potential effect on food security  
By allowing the governments of ECOWAS countries to complement better international aid when 
a crisis occurs, the RR Project is likely to reduce the response delays and to improve the response 
adequacy. 
Reducing the (national and international) response delays. The RR Project seeks to improve 
food security by providing governments with the means to manage food crisis during the time 
necessary for mobilizing international aid. This approach seems relevant considering the delays 
in mobilizing food aid during past crises (especially Niger 2005 and 2010 crises). The resources 
providing by the RR Project (increased national PS, RR) are adequate to implement interventions 
very quickly, contrary to international aid or policies based on imports. Theoretically, these 
resources are sized to allow all ECOWAS countries to manage the delays in mobilizing food aid (in 
the situation where all countries would be hit at the same time).   
Note that, during Niger 2005 and 2010 crises, the delays mobilizing international aid were not 
only due to the fact that the internal community was occupied by other events in other part of the 
World (the tsunamis in Southeast Asia in 2005, the earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan in 
2010): the fact that governments were reluctant to recognize the crisis also played a very 
important role. It appears that governments were reluctant to recognize the crisis because they 
did not have the means to manage them and because they know they will not be associated to the 
management of international aid. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that with a major role 
to play both before and after the arrival of international aid (see the previous section on food 
sovereignty), the government would be more willing to recognize food crises. This is likely to 
reduce the delays in mobilizing international aid as shown by the experience of Niger 2005 and 
2010 crises where the lack of recognition of the crisis by the government resulted in longer delay 
for mobilizing international aid.  
This is also likely to reduce the delays in implementing internal aid. During the 2005 crisis, 
interventions based on international aid were delayed because of the lack of availability of grains 
to be bought on the regional market. 
Providing a more adequate response. The RR Project is also likely to allow a more adequate 
response. By allowing acting sooner when a crisis occur, the RR Project is likely to reduce the 
needs for costly nutritional recovery programs (they accounted for more than 60% of the budget 
for managing the Niger 2010 crisis). This may provide resources for other type of actions less 
focused on emergency and more on medium-run food security (increase in household livelihoods 
and resilience, public services…). 
By building physical stocks mainly made of local staples (increase national PS + the physical 
component of the RR), the RR project allows more use of local staples in interventions (both 
interventions managed by the government and the WFP or NGOs).  This is likely to contribute to 
food security through different ways as it may i) contribute to mitigating the increase in the price 
of the grains most consumed by the poor, ii) reduce the delays, iii) reduce the cost as local staples 
are less expensive than imported grains (with the same budget, you can usually provide a quantity 
higher by 70%) and iv) better meet consumers habits and preferences (which is part of the 
definition of food sovereignty but also of food security).  
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Challenges. There is a risk anyway that the internal community may be less involved. In 2005 and 
2010, the international community has been mobilized because of evidences showing a strong 
increase in young children malnutrition rates. If the RR Project, by allowing a sooner and more 
adequate response, leads to reducing malnutrition rates, it may result in increasing the delays in 
mobilizing international aid and in reducing its magnitude. The solution to this problem would be 
mobilizing the international community by using the early and comprehensive indicators of food 
insecurity based on the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié, instead of malnutrition rates. This implies 
generalizing the (proper) use of the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié by all ECOWAS countries.  
 
4.2. Potential value added by the RR project vis-à-vis national policies 
Potential effect on the solidarity between ECOWAS Member countries 
Solidarity. The RR Project encompasses three forms of solidarity: 
 solidarity with the countries hit by food crises through the ‘mutualization’ of the RR: all 
countries country contribute; only countries in crisis benefit (the right to use the reserve 
–for free- in the name of regional solidarity being triggered by country food insecurity 
indicators based on the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié). The existence of the RR is also likely to 
incentivize countries to renounce implementing export bans measures (as occurred in 
2005 and 2008), all the more that, since January 2005, exports bans are illegal between 
ECOWAS countries. 
 solidarity with the countries vulnerable to food crises through i) the increase in national PS 
(funded by regional solidarity) and ii) the size of country right to use the reserve in the 
name of regional solidarity (its quota), as both of them both depend on: the percentage of 
population hit during the main shock recorded since 2000 and the delay in mobilizing 
international food aid (1.5 months for coastal countries and 3 months for landlocked 
countries).  
 solidarity with poor and landlocked countries, as these countries have a higher percentage 
of their needs covered (40% for LDC and landlocked countries, 20% for LDC or landlocked 
countries, 10% for coastal non-LDC countries) and as the funding through the Zero Hunger 
tax on country extra-ECOWAS total imports, will result in non-LDC coastal countries (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria) being the main contributors (77.5%) and Sahel countries the 
lowest contributors (5%), see figures 4 and 5 above .  
The last two forms of solidarity will result in Sahel countries benefiting from 89.6% of the rights 
to use the reserve (the quotas) and 77.5% of the increase in national PS funded by the region, 
while contributing only for 5% of the costs (through the Zero Hunger tax). In addition, as Sahel 
countries are more often hit by food crisis, the fact that the RR can be used only by countries in 
crisis (first form of solidarity) means that Sahel countries will use their (higher) quotas more 
often. All these remarks are even truer for Niger who will alone receive 51.5% of the quotas and 
46.5% of the increase in national PS funded by the reserve22. 
                                                             
22 Other forms of solidarity may emerge from the cooperation between national PS (the RESOGEST seeks 
to stimulate this kind of cooperation behaviors). 
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Tensions and challenges. Tensions between countries for the use of RR may emerge, especially 
when the food crisis affect many countries at the same time as is the case in crisis scenarios CS2 
and CS323. However, the rules of the RR have been designed to minimize these tensions. First, in 
theory, the size of the RR is enough to provide its quota to each country, meaning that even if all 
ECOWAS countries are hit at the same time, they don’t have to compete to access to the free 
support of the RR (however, they may compete for getting monetary or grain loans from the RR).  
Second, the use of the RR is triggered by CHB indicators which in theory allow comparing the state 
of food insecurity in different countries. However, tensions may still emerge especially if the RR 
Project is not fully implemented (insufficient increase in national PS and/or RR undersized), as in 
this case the resources will not be enough to allow country government to manage the crisis 
before the arrival of international aid.  Moreover, in the short run, difficulties may arise from the 
lack of reliable CHB data (some countries don’t use it or don’t use it properly, with only part of the 
required information being gathered). In order to avoid these difficulties, it is necessary i) to 
create the Zero Hunger tax in order to guarantee the full implementation of the RR Project 
(increase in national PS + RR) and ii) to generalize the (proper) use of the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié 
within all ECOWAS countries.  
Tensions may also occur regarding the funding of the RR Project. Because of the high level of 
solidarity in the RR Project, countries that are supposed to contribute a lot and likely to receive 
few may be reluctant to contribute to its funding. As the solidarity is likely to play almost always 
on the same side (from rich coastal countries to Sahel countries), the term ‘mutualization’ is rather 
misleading and it raises the question of the interest of rich coastal countries in supporting the RR 
Project.  Maybe this interest can be found in coastal countries’ experience that, in periods of food 
crisis in the Sahel, they are affected by massive migrations to the south of people and livestock, 
which generates tensions and conflicts24. Another potential reason is related to the political crises 
provoked by jihadists’ movements at the border between Sahel countries and coastal countries 
(Boko Haram, Mujao, AQMI etc.). But this solidarity may also be driven by the feeling of peoples 
that they have a common destiny with neighboring countries’ peoples25, providing support to 
policy-makers when they go for solidarity.   
 
Potential effect on food security  
Increasing the means of national governments. An obvious effect value-added of the RR Project 
is that it increases the stocks in the hands of national government, allowing them to do more to 
manage food crises. The stocks of national governments are limited by their high cost and the lack 
of budget to fund them. The RR Project provides answers to these issues through: 
 Mutualization: as countries are usually not hurt at the same time, pooling their means is 
supposed to be an effective way to manage crises. The RR (410,000 tons) is partly built 
on this idea and the RESOGEST as well. However, the most probable is that the countries 
                                                             
23 And even more when coastal countries are hit (as in the crisis scenario CS3), as in this case they may be 
unwilling to accept that, although they contribute more, they have to receive less.   
24 Other spillover effects may occur such as grain price crises in the Sahel pulling-up grain prices 
(especially maize price) in coastal countries. 
25 They often have common history, culture and languages. During the last Ebola crisis, some countries of 
the region were proud to let their border open with the neighboring (affected) countries.  
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who will benefit from the reserve will often be the same: Sahel countries (and among them 
Niger)26.  
 Solidarity: both the increase in the level of national PS (+650,000 tons) and the free use of 
the RR will be covered by regional solidarity. This solidarity will mainly play in favor of 
the most affected countries (Niger, then the other Sahel countries). 
Promoting the ‘think regional’ in early warning and diagnostic. Early warning is usually 
based on national indicators. But the Niger 2005 showed that misunderstanding the situation and 
the dynamics of the regional market led to strongly underestimating the Niger crisis. The RR, by 
using the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié to compare the situation of various countries spontaneously 
will lead to promote the ‘think regional’ and is therefore likely to improve the diagnostic and early 
warning of food crises.  
Promoting a ‘regional response’ to ‘regional crisis’. When a crisis is regional and a large-scale 
increase of staple prices, when a PS provides in-kind transfers in a given country, the downward 
pressure on staple prices in its domestic market is limited because if the domestic price goes 
down, this is likely to increase exports to the neighboring countries. The solution to this problem 
is simultaneous interventions of national PS. Although the RR Project does not contemplate any 
kind of mechanism to coordinate the interventions of national PS27, it may contribute indirectly to 
the simultaneous use of stock intervention by increasing the means of all ECOWAS country 
governments (increased national PS, right to use the RR).  
 
These different potential benefits of the RR Project (and the related challenges) are summarized 
in table 11 below. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
26 Although countries may be hurt not only by climatic shocks (that affect mainly Sahel countries) but also, 
for instance, by shocks on international markets or political crises. For instance grain prices are currently 
high in Nigeria because of the low level of the Naira which itself stems from the low level of oil price on 
international markets.  
27 The RESOGEST is unlikely to play this role : it’s a network of PS agencies but PS agencies do not design PS 
interventions, they only implement them. 
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Table 11. Potential benefits and challenges of the RR project (by objective) 
 Political objectives Food security objectives 
Vis-à-vis 
international aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food sovereignty of ECOWAS 
Member States  
 
Potential benefits 
 Governments more involved in 
managing food crisis before the 
arrival of international aid (thereby 
increasing their abilities) 
 More weight of governments in co-
managing the international aid 
(especially when there is a scarcity of 
local staples and when the 
government holds stocks). 
 Higher share of local staples in the aid 
provided (which therefore fits better 
with consumers’ preferences and 
habits). 
 Local procurements of the RR as a 
way to support local production 
 
 
Challenges  
The potential benefits will not be 
reached if Members States and RECs 
(ECOWAS and WAEMU) do not 
contribute to the building of the RR and 
if the Zero Hunger tax is not created 
(what would compromise the use of 
the reserve and the increase in national 
PS). For now, the only contributor who 
complied with its commitments is the 
EU. 
 
Improving FS by complementing  
international aid  
 
Potential benefits  
Reducing the (national and 
international)  response delays: 
 National response possible while 
mobilizing international aid 
 Governments more likely to 
recognize the magnitude of the 
crisis if they have some means to 
manage it, thereby reducing the 
delays in mobilizing international 
aid 
 The availability of physical stocks 
(increased national PS + RR) may 
allow reducing the delays for 
implementing international aid 
(especially when there is a 
scarcity of grains on the regional 
market, as in 2005 and 2012).   
 
Providing a more adequate answer: 
 Acting sooner may reduce the 
needs for costly nutritional 
recovery programs (more 60% of 
the budget for managing the 
Niger 2010 crisis), thereby saving 
means for more medium-term 
action focused on households 
livelihoods and resilience  
 The availability of physical stocks 
may allow more use of local 
staples in (national and 
international) interventions, 
what may contribute in reducing 
the cost and delays of 
interventions and in mitigating 
the increase in the price of these 
staples (which are the most 
consumed by the poor)  
 
Challenges  
Risk of the international community 
being less involved (as their 
involvement has often been 
triggered by huge malnutrition 
rates.  
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Vis-à-vis national 
policies 
Solidarity between ECOWAS member 
States 
Potential benefits 
Solidarity with countries hit by food 
crises: 
 the right to use the RR is triggered 
by food security indicators (based 
on the Cadre Harmonisé).  
 the existence of the RR is likely to 
incentivize countries to renounce 
implementing export bans. 
 
Solidarity with countries vulnerable to 
food crises, as countries strongly 
affected by past crises and landlocked: 
 will have a higher quota (right to 
use the RR for free, in the name of 
regional solidarity)  
 will receive a higher support from 
the regional solidarity to increase 
the level of their PS  
 
Solidarity with landlocked and poor 
countries: 
 will have a higher quota as a 
higher % of their needs is covered  
 will contribute very few as country 
contribution will be based on 
country value of extra ECOWAS 
imports (Zero Hunger tax)  
 
The resulting effect is Sahel countries 
will concentrate 89.6% of the quotas 
and 77.5% of the increase in national 
PS funded by regional solidarity. 
 
Challenges 
 Tension may occur between 
countries for the use of the RR. 
They can be limited by fully 
implementing the RR Project 
(building a 400,000 tons RR + 
increasing national PS by 650,000 
tons) and if the (proper) use of the 
Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié is 
generalized among ECOWAS 
countries. 
 Tensions may occur for the 
funding, as the countries supposed 
to contribute a lot and receive few 
may be reluctant to contribute.   
Improving FS by complementing  
national policies   
Potential benefits 
 
Increasing the means of national 
governments through: 
 Mutualization: a common tool 
(the RR) and cooperation 
between PS agencies 
(RESOGEST) 
 Solidarity: the increase in the 
level of national PS (+650,000 
tons) and the free use of the RR 
will be covered by regional 
solidarity.  
 
Promoting the ‘think regional’ in 
early warning and diagnostic: 
 The use of the Cadre Harmonisé 
Bonifié to compare the situation 
of various countries will lead to 
take into account the regional 
dimension if crisis, thereby 
improving the diagnostic and 
early warning of food crises (the 
misunderstanding of the 
situation and dynamics of the 
regional market led to strongly 
underestimating the Niger 
2005crisis). 
 
Promoting a ‘regional response’ to 
‘regional crisis’: 
 By increasing the means of all 
ECOWAS country governments, 
the RR Project may lead to the 
simultaneous use of national PS 
intervention, thereby 
contributing to mitigating much 
more effectively surges of staple 
prices. 
 
Challenges 
These potential benefits will be lost if 
the RR project is not implemented or 
if its only partially implemented 
(national PS and RR undersized).   
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4.3. Perspectives  
The next step is clearly implementing the RR project, what implies that i) Members States and 
RECs (ECOWAS and WAEMU) deliver their contribution to the building of the RR and ii) the Zero 
Hunger tax is created (what is a necessary condition to increase national PS and fund the use of 
the RR. If this is not the case, the coherence of the RR project would be completely lost, as well as 
its potential benefits on food sovereignty, solidarity between ECOWAS countries and food 
security. A partial implementation of the RR Project (with national PS and RR undersized) would 
not allow improving significantly food sovereignty and food security and is likely to exacerbate 
the tensions between countries to access the RR.  
Another issue is related to the use of the Cadre Harmonisé Unifié (CHB) to estimate the level of 
country food insecurity. Although the CHB is the official tool of the region, it is not used by all 
ECOWAS countries. It is important to generalize and improve its use not only to allocate the RR 
but also to improve the diagnostic and early warning of food crises.  
A further development of the RR Project may be rendering the rice CET flexible. We have seen that 
in 2008 many WAEMU countries removed unilaterally the rice CET to mitigate the increase in the 
price cost of imports. Why not rendering the CET flexible? It may increase or decrease (even 
becoming negative if needed) depending on international prices or ECOWAS countries food 
security situation. This is an idea (not even a project for now) which circulated in West Africa. A 
study on this topic has been commissioned by ECOWAS to IFPRI. As the 2008 experience showed 
that countries have difficulties to apply for a long time import tax removal (because of their weight 
in country budgetary resources), a solution may be to compensate the country loss in budgetary 
resources with the Zero Hunger tax.  In periods of high grains prices it would make sense to 
remove taxes on grains and replace the by taxes on less important and less sensitive goods.    
It also possible to imagine that in the future the RR may be used not only for managing crises but 
also to help poor households to recover their livelihoods when impoverished by a crisis. It is now 
well-known that there is a continuum between food crises and chronic malnutrition, especially in 
countries where food crises are very frequent (as Sahel countries). It has been reported that after 
a crisis households who had to deep into their savings and sell assets to cope with the crisis often 
to not have the time to recover when the next crisis arrives. Therefore, from a crisis to the next 
one they lose their capital and their resilience. By improving the management of food crises, the 
RR project may contribute to reduce this problem. If allowed to intervene also in post-crisis 
periods its contribution can be even higher.   
The RR Project framework may be a source of inspiration for other regions of the world: SADC 
already showed interest in the idea and another experience of regional reserve is on-going in Asia 
(ASEAN+3 rice reserve). The RR project may even produce interesting lessons on how to manage 
price instability on international market: in 2008, many countries implemented export bans on 
rice (and to some extent on wheat), thereby exacerbated the surge in international prices (Headey 
2011). Export bans were implemented at the same time by many West African countries (for local 
staples) and have been one of the main drivers for building the RR Project (in order to overcome 
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the observed ‘lack of solidarity’). Therefore, if successful, the RR Project may well be a source of 
inspiration for international policies28.  
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Table A.1. Calibration of the RR and the required increase in national PS 
 
(*) Estimate based on the WFP norm: 15kg per person per month 
Source: our calculus based on ECOWAS (2012): table 3 p. 38 for annual needs; note 18 p. 39 for the list of coastal countries and landlocked countries 
(that determines the % of the needs that should be met regionally: 1.5 or 3 months); note 19 p. 40 for the lists of LDCs/non LDCs countries (that jointly 
with the coastal/landlocked criterion determines the % of the needs met regionally that should be covered by the RR). 
Population in 
2020 (000s) Population Affected following 
Most Serious Crisis (%)
Annual Estimated 
Needs by 2020 (Tons)*
% of the needs that should 
be met regionaly 
Needs that should be 
met regionaly 
% of the needs met 
regionaly covered by the RR
Needs covered 
by the RR
Needs covered by 
national PS
Current level of 
national PS (SNS)
Required increase in 
national PS
Benin 11523 4% 82966 12,5% 10371 20% 2074 8297 8297
Burkina Faso 22150 18% 717660 25% 179415 40% 71766 107649 28000 79649
Cape Verde 544 7% 6482 25% 1621 20% 324 1296 1296
Côte d’Ivoire 24503 4% 176422 12,5% 22053 10% 2205 19847 19847
Gambia 2 242 36% 145282 12,5% 18160 20% 3632 14528 14528
Ghana 30325 4% 218340 12,5% 27293 10% 2729 24563 24563
Guinea 12765 4% 91908 12,5% 11489 20% 2298 9191 9191
Guinea-Bissau 1863 8% 25989 12,5% 3249 20% 650 2599 2599
Liberia 5166 13% 120884 12,5% 15111 20% 3022 12088 12088
Mali 20537 23% 850232 25% 212558 40% 85023 127535 17000 110535
Niger 22071 53% 2118286 25% 529572 40% 211829 317743 32000 285743
Nigeria 203869 4% 1467857 12,5% 183482 10% 18348 165134 150000 15134
Senegal 15998 7% 201575 12,5% 25197 20% 5039 20158 20158
Sierra Leone 7178 4% 51682 12,5% 6460 20% 1292 5168 5168
Togo 7343 4% 52870 12,5% 6609 20% 1322 5287 5287
ECOWAS 388,077 6328433 1252637 411554 841083 227000 614083
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Table A.2: Minimum proportion of different products in the RR (by storage site)  
 
RR Storage sites   
Products Eastern Central West Atlantic Gulf Atlantic Total 
  56% 40% 2,30% 1,60% 100,00% 
Maize 15% 30% 10% 25% 21,03% 
Millet-sorghum 50% 30% 40% 
 
40,92% 
Rice 
 
10% 20% 50% 5,26% 
Gari 10% 10% 
  
9,60% 
Enriched cereals 5% 5% 
  
4,80% 
Source: adapted from ECOWAS (2012) 
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Table A.3. Detailed costs of the RR (constitution + maintenance)  
 
Source: RAAF / PASANAO (2015) 
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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total 
Size of the reverve ( thousands of tons)  -  Scenario 2
 Regional reserve 176 176 176 176 294 294 294 412
 Financial reserve 116 116 116 116 194 194 194 272
 Physical reserve  60 60 60 60 100 100 100 140
Costs of the Physical reserve ( thousands of dollars)
Stocking costs      27 452          18 301          18 301         64 054   
Millet tons 288 50 338 24 361 25%        5 419            3 613            3 613         12 645   
Sorghum tons 260 50 310 22 332 24%        4 780            3 187            3 187         11 154   
Maize tons 278 50 328 23 351 26%        5 473            3 648            3 648         12 770   
Rice tons 632 50 682 48 730 7%        3 065            2 043            2 043          7 151   
Gari tons 366 50 416 29 445 14%        3 739            2 493            2 493          8 724   
Enriched flour tons 1500 50 1550 109 1659 5%        4 976            3 317            3 317         11 610   
Cost of warehouse rental tons 12          733            733            733            733            1 221            1 221            1 221            1 709          8 303   
Cost of maintenance of stock (security, fumigation, etc.) tons 29        1 735          1 735          1 735          1 735            2 892            2 892            2 892            4 048         19 664   
Cost of management by the national operator 2%          549            549            549            549              915              915              915            1 281          6 222   
Annual losses 2%          549            549            549            549              915              915              915            1 281          6 222   
Costs of stock rotation 
       Cost of stock depreciation tons 10%          915            915            1 525            2 135          5 490   
      Costs of replenishment of stocks (intra annual price variation)  tons 9%          824            824            1 373            1 922          4 941   
Total  ( I )      31 017          5 304          3 566          5 304          24 244            8 841            5 943          30 678      114 897   
Costs of financial reserve ( thousands of dollars)
Costs of conversion into physical stock      53 247          35 498          35 498       124 243   
Provison for price risk 15%        7 987            5 325            5 325         18 636   
interests 3% -      1 597   -      1 597   -      1 597   -       1 597   -       2 662   -       2 662   -       2 662   -     14 377   
Total ( I I )      61 234   -      1 597   -      1 597   -      1 597          39 225   -         2 662   -         2 662          38 160      128 503   
Costs of reserve governance and external institutional strenghtening
Investments 90 0 0 0 0 70 0 0          160   
Payroll 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282       10 256   
Operation 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144        1 150   
activities 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661        5 292   
      - of which external institutional strenghtening  160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160        1 280   
Control, certification and audit 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104          835   
Unforeseen expenses 5% 114 110 110 110 110 113 110 110          885   
Total ( I I I )        2 556          2 461          2 461          2 461            2  461            2 535            2 461            2 461        19 857   
Grand Total ( I + I I + I I I )  -  Thousands of dollars      94 807          6  168          4 429          6  168          65 930            8 713            5 742          71 299      263 257   
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Table A.4. Anthropometric nutritional indicators (for selected countries) 
Country  Year 
 
Severe wasting 
of children < 5  
(in %) 
Wasting of 
children < 5  
(in %) 
Stunting of 
children < 5  
(in %) 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
BENIN 2014 0.9 4.5 34 
BURKINA FASO 2012 1.8 10.9 32.9 
BURUNDI 2010 1.4 6.1 57.5 
CHAD 2010 5.9 15.7 38.7 
COTE D'IVOIRE 2012 1.8 7.6 29.6 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 2010 1.7 3.1 26.2 
ETHIOPIA 2014 2.5 8.7 40.4 
GHANA 2014 0.7 4.7 18.8 
GUINEA 2012 4.1 9.9 31.3 
KENYA 2014 0.9 4 26 
LIBERIA 2013 2 5.6 32.1 
MALAWI 2014 1.1 3.8 42.4 
MALI 2006 6 15.3 38.5 
MOZAMBIQUE 2011 2.3 6.1 43.1 
NIGER (THE) 2012 6.9 18.7 43 
NIGERIA 2014 2 7.9 32.9 
RWANDA 2015 0.6 2.2 37.9 
SENEGAL 2014 0.7 5.8 19.4 
SIERRA LEONE 2013 4.3 9.4 37.9 
TANZANIA (THE) 2014 0.9 3.8 34.7 
TOGO 2014 1.5 6.7 27.5 
UGANDA 2012 0.3 4.3 34.2 
ZAMBIA 2013 2.5 6.3 40 
North Africa and Middle East countries 
ALGERIA 2012 1.4 4.1 11.7 
LEBANON 2004 2.9 6.6 16.5 
MOROCCO 2011 1 2.3 14.9 
TUNISIA 2012 1.7 2.8 10.1 
Asian countries (except Middle East) 
BANGLADESH 2014 3.1 14.3 36.1 
CAMBODIA 2014 2.3 9.6 32.4 
CHINA 2010 0.7 2.3 9.4 
INDIA 2014 4.6 15.1 38.7 
INDONESIA 2013 6.7 13.5 36.4 
PAKISTAN 2012 3.3 10.5 45 
PHILIPPINES (THE) 2013  7.9 30.3 
SRI LANKA 2012 3 21.4 14.7 
THAILAND 2012 2.2 6.7 16.3 
VIET NAM 2013  5.7 19.4 
Countries from Latin America and the Caribbean 
BOLIVIA  2012 0.5 1.6 18.1 
COLOMBIA 2010 0.2 0.9 12.7 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  2013 0.8 2.4 7.1 
ECUADOR 2012 0.7 2.3 25.2 
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EL SALVADOR 2014 0.4 2 14 
GUATEMALA 2009 0.2 1.1 48 
HAITI 2012 1.3 5.2 21.9 
HONDURAS 2012 0.3 1.4 22.7 
MEXICO 2012 0.4 1.6 13.6 
NICARAGUA 2006 0.5 1.5 23 
PERU 2013 0.1 0.4 17.5 
VENEZUELA  2009  4.1 13.4 
OECD Countries 
GERMANY 2005 0.1 1 1.3 
JAPAN 2010 0.2 2.3 7.1 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (THE) 2012 0 0.5 2.1 
Source: UNICEF-WHO-World Bank  
For each country, the data provided correspond to the most recent data available in the UNICEF-WHO-World Bank 
database.  
Severe Wasting: Percentage of children aged 0–59 months who are below minus three standard deviations from median 
weight-for-height of the WHO Child Growth Standards.        
Wasting – Moderate and severe: Percentage of children aged 0–59 months who are below minus two standard 
deviations from median weight-for-height of the WHO Child Growth Standards.     
Stunting – Moderate and severe: Percentage of children aged 0–59 months who are below minus two standard 
deviations from median height-for-age of the WHO Child Growth Standards.    
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Table A.5. Policies implemented by ECOWAS countries to manage the 2008 crisis 
 
Source: Soulé et al. (2008) 
